from Steve Keen
What are your preconceptions about the author of a book with the title The Next Economic Disaster: Why It’s Coming and How to Avoid It? Academic? Leftist? Anti-capitalist? Anti-banker certainly?
Prepare to drop them all, because the author is none of the above. Taking the last first, the majority of his career has been in banking — and as a founder and CEO.
To put it in his own words: Read more…
In economics, there is an unfortunate rift between academics and the economists who actually measure the economy. Which means that academic economists give little attention to the extremely important question how economic concepts relate to actual measurements – one reason why so much of their work is naïve (the ‘Ricardian’ household, which cuts consumption when government spending increases and the like). Fortunately, economic historians, who often have to do the measurements themselves, often bridge part of the gap. Robert Gallman has some highly relevant remarks about different ways to measure (nineteenth century USA) capital – and how these relate to the future, the past, uncertainty, savings, consumption foregone and replacement costs. This still leaves out important parts of the concept of capital like liquidity, ownership and the ‘overlapping generations’ problem – which however does not make these remarks less valuable. Read more…
The ‘Statistisches Bundesamt’ has a kind of app which helps companies to use data on historical inflation to insert ‘real price’ clauses in contracts – which can lead to a ‘price-price’ spiral. Interesting, as many economic models suppose that historical inflation is caused by expectations about future inflation (really!).
The German Handelsblatt has a very interesting article (sorry, no link) about business credit in the north (+1,4%) and the south (-5,9%) of the Euro Area. Which shows the difficulties of monetary policy in the Euro Area: one size fits none.
Eurostat published, coincidentally on July 17, data on EU energy imports from Russia. 39% of EU imports of natural gas and 34% of oil imports come from Russia. Also (including re-exports):
For seven Member States (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia) more than 75 % of their petroleum oils imports came from Russia. Twelve countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia), imported more than 75 % of total national imports of natural gas from Russia.
Price increases caused a surge in imports from Russia from 80 million euro in 2005 to 140 billion in 2013.
Recently, Eurostat published data on European house prices. Prices are, on average, falling with 0,3%, Year on year. Which is a good thing, especially for the young ones. More good news: deflated Euro area and European Union house prices indexes are however about 12% lower than at the height of the bubble, in 2007. I’m of the opinion that young people establishing a family should not be burdened with paying high tributes to the middle aged and elderly or to banks reaping unearned rent incomes! Houses have to be and can be affordable (and available) and lower prices in combination with lower interest and, in a number of countries, a limited increase in nominal wage rates did lead to increased affordability (the idea that low interest rates necessarily have to lead to high house prices is bad economics!). Good.
However – signs of exuberance are returning. These increases are, as such, maybe not yet alarming. But whenever they are associated with rising private debt – we’re in trouble.
And part of these increases are alarming. Prices in London (which is about ten times as large as Estonia) ewcwntly increased with 20% YoY, a record. In Dublin (where prices declined during the crisis, but not to anything like a low level), prices are increasing at a double-digit rate, too. The 2013 the German rate of change seems to be about 10% (Eurostat does not have recent German data), though the most recent data seem to indicate that this rise has abated. Read more…
Dear mrs. Sekera,
thank you for your very clear and insightful blogpost on this blog about economists and their distorted concept of public goods. But I’m afraid you’re way to positive about at least mainstream macro models and ‘public goods’. Very often – these models do not have a concept of public goods.
Too often, neoclassical ‘macro’ models do not have any logical space for public goods or ‘government consumption’ (i.e. consumption by households produced or financed by the government, like education) at all. Which is daft. My country – the Netherlands - would not even exist without coastal defences. And believe me – we learned about the necessity of well maintained large-scale public coastal defences the
New Orleans hard way (Knibbe, forthcoming). But in the default DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) models, public expenditure on coastal defences is, by definition, ‘wasteful’ – as it’s government expenditure. You are attacking Samuelson – but Samuelson in fact crafted his ideas – which as you state do have basic flaws – to combat exactly this kind of thinking! But he failed. This kind of thinking is alive and kicking. And kicking hard – as the over five million unemployed in Spain can testify. Even incorporating the ideas of Samuelson into these models would be a huge step forward – these at least consider the existence of public goods and services.
The Oosterscheldekering coastal defence. Wasteful?
There are endeavours to change this. But the very fact that these articles have to state, in an explicit way, their difference with ‘standard’ neoclassical ‘macro’ by introducing the notion that public expenditure can serve a purpose shows the ‘state of the mainstream art': Read more…
from June Sekera
A year ago last May, the Real World Economics Review blog published my post, “Why Aren’t We Talking About Public Goods?” In that article I argued that we need to revive and reframe the concept of public goods. A concept of public goods is immensely important because:
- The absence of a widely-held, constructive idea of public goods in public discourse denies citizens the ability to have an informed conversation, or to make informed decisions, about things that matter mightily to the quality of their lives and their communities.
- Its absence robs public policy makers, leaders and managers of the concept that is most central to the reason for their being.
- The current economics definition of public goods feeds and supports the marketization and privatization of government, and the consequent undermining of governments’ ability to operate.
Since last May I have met with economists and other social scientists across the US and in the UK and have been in discussion with people responding to my post from several other countries. I have also been conducting further research.
In this post I summarize the results of my discussions and findings to date and offer for consideration some criteria for a possible “instrumental” definition of public goods. Ultimately, an instrumental definition of public goods must be accompanied by a concordant theory of non-market production in the public economy. Both are needed to ground an improved theory and practice of governance.
1. The Existing Definition and Its Inadequacies Read more…
The ONS has published new data on British productivity. These show that the unprecedented 5% productivity decline has to quite an extent a lasting nature as it was mainly located in finance and the oil industry, which means that potential GDP also declined with the same amount. According to the ONS,
New analysis of industry contributions to productivity movements since the economic downturn shows large negative contributions from production industries other than manufacturers and from the financial services industry.
See also my take on this from a year ago (including productivity graph). Look also here. Productivity has however started to increase again, which means that potential GDP, though lower than before 2008, is increasing again (Okun’s law) while the surprising increase of British employment is not due to special productivity lowering British labour market mechanics (the British labour market is not special, despite flexibility) but to buoyant demand in non-financial, non-oil sectors (possibly to an extent caused by lower income inequality):
UK labour productivity was little changed in the first quarter of 2014, as growth of labour inputs broadly matched the expansion of economic output. Output per hour grew by 0.2% in the first quarter in service industries, and by 0.5% in production industries
The rise in productivity was to be expected.
For quite some time Latvia was an austerity and internal devaluation poster child. Lately, however, the voices lauding ultra-unemployment and the crushing of already very low wages have silenced – as wages are rising rapidly. For a time I suspected, cynically, that this wage shock might be a cunning plan of these sly Baltics – once they joined the Euro they increased their wage level (Latvia business economy wages increased at a healthy 7% rate, 2014 Q1 (Eurostat), directly after Latvia joined the Euro), to obtain a free Bratwurst.
But this was probably not the case. According to a new NBER working paper by Cavallo, Neiman and Rigobon, market forces might be at work. Joining the Euro seems to lead to a fast convergence of price levels:
Does membership in a currency union matter for prices and for a country’s real exchange rate? The answer to this question is critical for thinking about the implications of joining (or exiting) a common currency area. This paper is the first to use high-frequency good-level data to demonstrate that the answer is yes, at least for an important subset of consumption goods. We consider the case of Latvia, which recently dropped its pegged exchange rate and joined the euro zone. We analyze the prices of thousands of differentiated goods sold by Zara, the world’s largest clothing retailer. Price dispersion between Latvia and euro zone countries collapsed swiftly following entry to the euro. The percentage of goods with nearly identical prices in Latvia and Germany increased from 6 percent to 89 percent. The median size of price differentials declined from 7 percent to zero.
The ECB published a report on the results of the Macro Prudential Research Network. It’s the scientific answer of the ECB to the crisis: what has to change in our view of the economy? Considering the subject the paper, basically a dense abstract of post 2008 ECB research on this subject, is well written, though it’s clearly not intended for people who haven’t finished economics 101 (or 202).
I have read only a few of the many reports cited in this paper. Based upon the little I’ve read and the paper itself the next things can be stated about this potential pathbreaking (it’s intended to be pathbreaking!) piece of economics:
It’s a step away from rational expectations and general equilibrium: good. It tries to model the financial sector using insights of people like Minsky and Kindleberger: good. It does not just pay attention to the flow economy but also to the stock economy (debts, assets like houses): good. It tries to model a financial sector: good. Despite the fact that the monthly monetary statistics of the ECB are totally endogenous by nature and based upon the idea that credit and money are two sides of the same coin (of course they are, as they try to measure the real world), endogenous money still seems to be a bridge too far: bad (but I, or the person who wrote the abstract, might have missed something). Not enough attention is given to the ECB reports on international trade, which again and again show that lowering wages is not the way towards buoyant exports. Lower wages do decrease imports, as domestic expenditure goes down (duh….). But they do not lead to any noticeable break in the long run pattern of export growth (Spain!). The reader should be aware that a ‘VAR’ is a multidimensional moving average. Caveat (again): I did read only a few of the research papers behind this impressing document.
The policy take away: money (and monetary credit) matters. It’s not just a ‘veil’ over the real economy. To be precise: it’s not a ‘classical’ veil. Read Minsky (1992) about this (who bases his view on Schumpeter (1933), Fischer (1934), Keynes (1936), Kindleberger (1978). The insights above are, when push comes to play not exactly fresh and pathbreaking – but a rediscovery of received wisdom. Not too little – but too late. As millions of needless unemployed in the Euro Area can testify.
Is the BIS right to warn about the long run dangers of long-term ultra accommodative monetary policies? Yes. But the BIS is wrong about the Eurozone. Interest rates policies in the Eurozone are not ultra-accommodative. They are only starting to become normally ‘accommodative’ – and not even for everyone. Also, not that long ago (the summer of 2012), ultra tight monetary policy almost led to the disorderly break up of the Euro Area. Eurozone monetary policy has not (repeat: not) led to ‘ultra accommodative’ interest rates and we’re only starting to recover from grave policy mistakes which induced tightening in the midst of the most severe post WW II recession to date.
* though banks have been paying low rates for quite some time now (and even these were increased, back in 2011…)
* it is has only been since some months that the same holds for the governments of, for instance, Spain, Italy and Greece. Rates paid by these countries were, totally unnecessary, immorally and destructively high and a main cause of the present Euro Area mess (graph 1 – as can be seen government rates were 7%-points higher in Italy than in Germany – while at that time inflation and government debt in both countries was about equal
Graph 1. Spread between italian and Spanish government rates and German rates. Courtesy: Erwan Mahé.
). Read more…
from Dean Baker and Jared Bernstein
There are many policies that can reduce inequality, but there is none as straightforward conceptually and as difficult politically as full employment. The basic point is simple: at low rates of unemployment, the demand for labor allows workers at the middle and bottom of the wage distribution to achieve gains in hourly wages, annual hours of work, and thus income.
Levels of unemployment are not the gift or curse of the gods; they are the result of conscious economic policy. The decision to tolerate high rates of unemployment is a choice. It is one that has enor-mous implications not just for the millions of people who are needlessly unemployed or underemployed but also for tens of millions of workers in the bottom half of the wage distribution whose bar-gaining power is undermined by high unemployment.
Unemployment and Wage Growth
In discussions of inequality and low wages, many on both the left and the right claim that what we need is a better educated workforce. Their argument is that because educated workers are more productive and workers’ pay reflects their productivity, they will earn more if we can persuade them to get more education. However, while more education is generally associated with higher wages, this is just part of the story. In most jobs, the value of workers’ labor depends on the demand for their labor. A retail clerk in a store or a waiter in a restaurant is far more productive, meaning they are generating far more revenue, when business is strong than when it is weak. This means that, in a strong economy, employers can afford to pay a worker with the same level of education and training a higher wage. Read more…
Claudio Borio and Piti Disyatat are concerned about low interest rates. Hmmm… At this moment, the Euro Area is deleveraging – despite ultra low interest rates, the German economy is doing only moderately well, at best, despite ultra low-interest rates, while the level of unemployment in countries like Greece and Spain is almost 20%-point above the level where any meaningful ‘Phillips curve’ (i.e. a relation between unemployment and nominal wages) still exists – despite ultra low interest rates (well, not for Greek and Spanish companies, of course). And at the moment house prices are, on average, slowly declining, while before 2009 dislocating house price inflation was arguable not so much caused by lower interest rates but by lending deregulation.
Still, their warnings should be taken serious – as there is no such thing as a natural rate of interest. As an example of ‘malinvestments’ during the boom phase associated with a subsequently unsustainable debt overhang as well as idle capital, a graph of house completions in Ireland (how could Irish economist ever miss that bubble, why do mainstream economists sometimes still argue that bubbles do not exist – read Borio and Disyatat) is added (house completions in the entire UK reached a peak level of 219.000 in 2006/2007). See also the latest J.W. Mason blogpost about interest rates, which more or less states that people are not searching for yield – but use their trust in money, the monetary system, the guarantee of the cyclical dynamics of money as well as prevailing monetary yields as a foundation to act upon (possibly guided, to an extent, by ‘animal spirits’, M.K.?) – which fits into the Borio/Disyatat story (or the other way around). Read more…
A) Greece: past Dickens. Supposed to happen when the monetary system fails you. See below.
B) The British consumption conundrum: not foretold but supposed to happen, considering the change in the income distribution. Conundrum solved. See below.
C) Voxeu: Eurozone austerity is self-defeating (A) - self-fulfilling crisis edition. It’s not different, this time.
D) Voxeu: Eurozone austerity is self-defeating (A) – debt deflation edition. Which we have known since the thirties (Irving Fisher actually already warns about ‘debt deflation’ in the beginning of the twenties (second edition of this)). The tens of billions which the Greek government was forced to borrow to recapitalize the banks, which was needed to plug their government debt restructuring induced capital shortage are not mentioned.
E) (No) investments in Greece, graph below. Investment in new dwellings declined to 10% of the peak level. Well, that was slightly unexpected – but in Ireland this happened, too.
Ad A) From Zero hedge and based upon a labour union investigation(h/t: David Taylor): this is what real, Great Depression like deflation looks like. The Greek are forced to use barter and to reinvent kinds of money and it’s not a pretty sight (for those who still believe the assumption of quite some neoclassical models that all companies use the same technology and only compete on (wage)costs: read recent ECB studies on competitivety, which are entirely consistent with the empirical findings from Salter in the sixties (in fact: fifties, it was published in 1960)): Read more…
Household debt in Greece is pretty low (70% of GDP, 2013), at least compared with countries like the Netherlands (139%, 2012), Denmark (149%, 2012) or Ireland (112%, 2012). Also, after 2010 Greek households paid down 24 billion of debt (part of this decline might be due to debts being written off by banks), despite of this debt as a % of GDP debt increased since 2010 as nominal GDP (a measure of total income) went down. While nominal debt is about as high as in 2007/2008, the index of debt as a % of GDP is about 40%-points higher (as a % of GDP it increased from about 55% to 70%).
from Lars Syll
The task of this book is to explain wage rigidities … It seems reasonable to hope that a successful explanation of wage rigidity would contribute to understanding the extent of the welfare loss associated with unemployment and what can be done to reduce it … Many theories of wage rigidity and unemployment include partial answers to these questions as part of their assumptions, so that the phenomena of real interest … are described in the theories’ assumptions. For instance, Lucas concludes that increased unemployment during recessions implies little welfare loss … Lucas’s policy conclusions are not strongly supported … Good support can come only from information that distinguishes his microeconomic assumptions from others yielding different policy recommendations.
A fanciful example may illustrate the danger of taking too narrow a view of instrumentalism. You are an explorer seeking contact with the Dafs, an isolated tribe about which almost nothing is known. You observe one of their villages through binoculars from far away … You observe that every morning on sunny days, men wearing bright yellow hats stand in the backyards and make sweeping gestures toward the sky … When you finally arrange a meeting with some Dafs, you meet a few men with yellow hats and a few other plainer people. Believing the first to be leaders, you offer them presents, at which point all the Dafs are outraged and assault you. What you have not observed is that yellow hats mark slaves, who throw grain to the household chickens in the yard on sunny days and inside on rainy ones … Read more…
Do DSGE economists really exclude ‘government consumption’ from their concept of household prosperity? Yes, they do.
Scientific economists explain ‘government consumption’ as follows:
Government acquisition of goods and services for current use to directly satisfy individual or collective needs of the members of the community is called government final consumption expenditure (GFCE.) It is a purchase from the national accounts “use of income account” for goods and services directly satisfying of individual needs (individual consumption) or collective needs of members of the community (collective consumption). GFCE consists of the value of the goods and services produced by the government itself other than own-account capital formation and sales and of purchases by the government of goods and services produced by market producers that are supplied to households – without any transformation – as “social transfers” in kind.
Source: Wikipedia, which shows that this isn’t any kind of secret – it’s has been ‘received wisdom’ since the fifties of the twentieth century.
Also, total, i.e. individual (education) plus collective (property rights) government, consumption is a well-defined and fully measured part of the National Accounts. It’s not like a fuzzy, unmeasurable, pre-scientific concept like neoclassical ‘utility’. Look here for the most recent Eurostat estimates of what’s called ‘Actual Individual Consumption': Read more…
A central argument of Piketty is the idea that if ‘r’, the realized return on all kind of capital (houses, bonds, stock, land,…) turns out to be larger than the rate of growth, capital, estimated as a % of total GDP, will tend to increase as the extra money can be reinvested in new capital (or (via securitized mortgages?) increase prices of existing capital: the famous ‘search for yield’).
Sources: Bank of England, Sveriges Riksbank, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Eurostat.
The rate of growth is, however, a variable. Read more…
From: Peter Radford
I just received an email from the London School of Economics asking me to donate, as a loyal alumni, so that they can devote funds to “innovation”. The university of the future seems to be the objective of this innovation.
What on earth is this?
What about higher education needs innovating?
Why the imperative?
I understand that higher education productivity measured in business terms is, to be blunt, weak. And I understand that more modern techniques as enabled by digital technologies will, no doubt, disintermediate education and make the classic class/lecture room setting look antiquated. But what are the consequences?
For teachers. Read more…
The British economy has not yet recovered in any meaningful sense of the word. Production per capita is not back to historical levels, private debts are still sky-high, the number of crappy jobs is increasing and productivity is about 7 to 8% below ‘trend’ (a downward adjusted trend, that is), which is of course consistent with the increase of crappy jobs. Also, according to the PSE
The percentage of households who fall below society’s minimum standard of living has increased from 14 per cent to 33 per cent over the last 30 years, despite the size of the economy doubling. This is one of the stark findings from the largest study of poverty and deprivation ever conducted in the UK. Other key figures reveal that almost 18 million people cannot afford adequate housing conditions; 12 million people are too poor to engage in common social activities; one in three people cannot afford to heat their homes adequately in the winter and four million children and adults aren’t properly fed by today’s standards … full-time work is not always sufficient to escape from poverty.
But…… Read more…
1) Tyler Cowen is slightly bullish about the UK economy and calls it a ‘classical’ recovery, i.e. caused by market induced changes in relative prices. Cowen mentions the labour market but forgets about the decline of the price of the British pound (and about the recent house price bubble, too – though house prices estimated in Euro of course declined more/increased less, post 2008).
Graph 1: pound/dollar exchange rate.
Source: trading economics.
2). At Voxeu, David Hendry and Grayham Mizon explain how in the real world unpredictable shifts make a mess of modern economic models which assume ‘ergodicity’, i.e. a kind of predictable predestination of our economies:
Figure 1 Location shifts over 1860–2011 in UK unemployment, with major historical events
Extrinsic unpredictability Read more…