The Glass Wall
from Edward Fullbrook
Last week in Paris I had two days of discussions on the state of economics, including two dinners in restaurants of the kind to which my budget does not usually run, with three economists, three trans-disciplinary physicists, one Silicone Valley billionaire, his hedge fund manager and his charitable foundation director who diplomatically refereed our dog fights. These included numerous squabbles on how mimetic theory should be applied to bubbles, as well as more venomous disagreements such as when in the first session one of the physicists, who appeared to loathe the other two, went for their jugulars, and the moment in the final session when the fund manager revealed himself to be a Freidmanite and pronounced me “superficial”.
Unquestionably I was the shabby man out. The sociology of this mini conference of the Imitatio Economic Forum bears significance to a point I wish to make. The other three economists and the three physicists all came from the upper most crust of world academia. Even the nature of the venue was beyond my previous experience. The École Normale Supérieure (ENS) and the École Polytechnique (Poly) are to France, only a bit more so, what Oxford and Cambridge are to the UK, and Harvard and Stanford are to the US. The venue was the private onsite apartment of the head of the ENS, the hyper elegant moral philosopher Monique Canto-Sperber. One of the economists, André Orléan, as well as being director of France’s Centre national de la recherche scientifique, belongs to the ENS, another and the organizer of our meetings, Jean-Pierre Dupuy, enjoys a dual affiliation with the Poly and Stanford, and the career of the third economist, Paul David, has spanned Harvard, Oxford and currently Stanford and the Poly. Two of the physicists are Stanford based, and the third, a young Russian – who after his assault vanished never to return – is at the Poly.
So why did they invite me? Two reasons. Firstly, I share an interest, although a more tangential one, in giving front-page consideration in economics to what I call “intersubjectivity” and they “mimetic theory”. The origin of their focus, and it is of much importance to them, is the oeuvre of the Stanford-based, French-American thinker René Girard. Using different vocabularies, we all seek to reverse, especially at its theoretical level, economics’ axiomatic exclusion of the obvious and increasingly paramount fact that the subjectivities, and hence behaviours, of economic agents are interdependent. The formal link between Girard’s thought and French economics extends back to 1982 when Orléan, now a sort of Krugman-like figure in France, and Michel Aglietta, also prominent, published La Violence de la monnaie. Out of their work and Dupuy’s grew a school which in several papers around the turn of century I introduced to the English language world as “the French Intersubjectivists”. And in 2002 Routledge published my large edited collection Intersubjectivity in Economics, a project which first took shape for me over lunch with Dupuy and Orléan.
Their second reason for inviting me was my work at internationalizing the Post-Autistic Economics Movement and developing the real-world economics review. Like all outsider schools, the French Intersubjectivists covet more influence. They hoped I could give them some pointers.
I also came with hopes, faint though they were. One suspects many heterodox economists dream not of the day when neoclassicalism is demoted to a supporting role but when it invites them to share the throne. Susceptibility to this fantasy stems from the failure of heterodoxies to combine their advances on neoclassicalism to create a new paradigm, including a narrative that integrates our renderings of the economic realm into a teachable and compelling real-world syllabus. This requires give and take. At this meeting in Paris I had hoped to interest the Intersubjectivists in the process of kick-starting the intersubjective process that would lead to the integration of our teachings. More than any other school, I thought them well endowed for the task. Besides having the intellectual apparatus to conceptualize the endeavour itself, they also possess an analytics of demand desperately needed by ecological economics, and after hours of bubble talk they left me in no doubt that their understanding of the Global Financial Collapse rivals Keynesians (real ones) and Minskites, such that even Steve Keen could gain insights from them.
Paris, despite the disappointment that I am about to relate, was a positive experience, not least because I enjoyed everyone’s company, including the hedgie’s. David was an inspiration, the billionaire showed himself possessed of serious good intentions, Dupuy and Orléan were as stimulating and charming as ten years ago and the two Stanford physicists and foundation director embedded themselves forever on the pleasure side of my memory. But with the possible exception of David [this week he assumes the presidency of the Western Economics Association International] I failed miserably, despite a detailed plan, to tempt the Intersubjectivists into engaging with other heterodox communities with the intent of bringing some cohesion to the stories we tell the world. But they did, ironically and perhaps with a touch of melancholy, like the following paragraph from my paper:
By definition, each heterodoxy has a major quarrel with orthodoxy, with each having its own point of divergence, and from which, even if it was not the origin of its founding, it now forms its primary self-identity. As a consequence not only does each heterodox school begin in isolation from other ones, but its primary point of reference remains the neoclassical mainstream. Historically there has been little interchange between different branches of heterodox economics, instead where inter-school exchange has taken place it has been mostly between neoclassical economics and individual heterodox schools. Upon reflection this is not as surprising as it sounds. Because the members of the various schools come to identify themselves in terms of their points of divergence from the dominant school they retain a working awareness of the common ground, usually quite large, that exists between them and neoclassicalism. Between heterodox schools, on the other hand, their common ground is their outsider status, so that their commonality relates mainly not to economic ideas but to the position of those ideas and their holders in a socio-cultural-economic structure. It is my experience that nearly all heterodox economists are more conversant with neoclassical economics than they are with any heterodox school other than their own.
It is that absence of intersubjective give and take, the failure of the real-world heterodoxies to develop between them a compelling common ground by accommodating their individual narratives to a larger one for the big screen of Economics 101 and the evening news, that guarantees to keep the now vulnerable neoclassicals in power. The Paris ensemble in part understood this. But, for the moment at least, they show no appetite for the required task. Understandably, they are more at ease with other upper crust academics than with renegades from the academic outback. Perhaps they are also mindful that billionaires generally prefer French cuffs to plain ones. Long ensconced in elite institutions and accustomed to their privileges and perks, like their well-remunerated intermezzo in Paris, their working-life identities resemble the guardians of the orthodoxy rather than embattled heterodox economists. With their offices literally opening onto the profession’s corridors of power, their school’s admission to the ruling mainstream appears never further away than an invitation to the room across the hall. But that accessibility is a fool’s illusion. A glass wall runs down the hall’s middle, and without the heterodox hoi polloi it will never be shattered.
25 June 2010




















No economy of words in this piece.
Thanks for the two things: the report; and the effort.
You hit the nail on the head: the common theme within the heterodox world is its antipathy towards orthodoxy. And I agree that most heterodox thinkers are more aware of the neoclassical system than other non-orthodox systems. This is, and will remain, the greatest blockage to progress.
Also: I endorse your call for the development of an alternative to orthodoxy of sufficient breadth and depth to represent a true ‘second look’ at economics widely writ, rather than just at pieces. Only when we have a large scale alternative will we break that glass wall.
I see two problems.
One is the diversity and scattered nature of heterodoxy. Banging out a common ground will be arduous, tedious, and full of argument. That should attract rather than repel enquiring minds. The second is the psychology of opposition: too many heterodox economists prize the warmth of their niche more than the cold and hard world of compromise. That makes getting a broad platform built difficult. Your Parisian excursion is just one example of the ramparts that need to be bridged before we create a true competitor to neoclassical theory.
Still we should rise to the challenge.
This platform is a start. The network it represents is a strength we need to tap into. What we need, ultimately, is an institutional coherence to challenge the old guard. That means funding. I hope you left that billionaire in good spirits!
During the last two decades I’ve been teaching all kinds of economics, like accounting, marketing, organisation, macro economics and micro economics. As a researcher, my main occupation has been the construction and measurement of historical series of production, productivity and consumption. I surely do know as much about all these subjects as about neoclassical economics – and at this moment I am able to make some comparisons.
When you look at it from the perspective of economics in a broad sense (including for instance a science like marketing), not ‘heterodox economics’ but neoclassical economics is the odd man out. It is absolutely amazing how much of the critique of ‘heterodox’ economists is incorporated by a science like, for instance, marketing. Marketing is about real companies who try to sell real goods to real people – while the neoclassical ‘theory’ of the homo economicus is about imaginary companies selling imaginary goods to imaginary people. ‘Rational man’ and ‘utility’ are not used in marketing, as you can’t sell nylons using these concepts. About all other sciences are used. Just read a textbook like J.P. Peter and J.C. Olson, Consumer Behaviour & Marketing Strategy (ninth edition, New York, McGraw-Hill 2010). It uses statistics, cultural antropology, psychology, economics (except the ideas of rational man and utility!)and sociology to explain the behaviour of the consumer. Even the ‘ritual’ aspects of human behaviour are discussed (and used to ‘sell nylons’).
To give only one example of the incorporation of heterodox critique into marketing: one of the (post-Keynesian) criticims about neoclassical economy is that neoclassical economists equate the moment of (monetary) market exchange with use and ‘utility’. After market exchange, there seems to be no time anymore, in the neoclasical universe. Though utility is not a concept which is used in marketing, marketeers do pay ample attention to what marxists call ‘use value’ and the time after market exchange (which, in the case of a house, can of course last for decades) and advise producers to establish lasting relations which their customers and to take explicit notice of consumer behaviour and experiences after market exchange. Use, use value and historical time is important for market value.
There are two things which all these different branches of economy have in common which each other and with, in fact, all of heterodox economics and which sets neoclassical economics aside from the mainstream (delta?) of ‘economics as a science’. One is the implicit or explicit rejection of individual, rational man, the other is a focus on measurement and the discovery of ‘novel facts’. As such, ‘economics as a science’ seems to be in line with science in general. When one reads ‘Science’ of December 18th, 2009, which lists the scientific ‘breakthroughs of the year’, it strikes the mind that all these breakthroughs concern ‘novel facts’ or ways to discover these facts.
Of course, facts only get meaning within a larger narrative and within a system of definitions and operationalisations. But that’s exactly the problem with neoclassical economics. The story of homo economicus is not fit to give meaning to the facts found by marketeers, historians, accountants, psychologists and whatever – it’s not a scientic story, based in facts and measurement. It’s a fable. Tellingly, students of economics are, unlike students of almost any other science, not tought how to measure, observe, assemble and gather basic data on wages, prices and the like. At best, they learn how to use data gathered by specialized statistical organizations. McCloskey points out that, contrary to textbooks of other sciences, textbooks of economics often do not contain famous examples of the discoveries of novel facts and on the heroes who discovered these facts. The textbook of Peter and Olson mentioned above is littered which such examples.
The lack of focus of (neoclassical) economics and the study of economics and economies on ‘how to measure’ has to change, as science involves measurement – and also as ‘economics as a science’ has made large progress in ‘how to measure’. In Science of september 18th, 2009, there is a very favourable review of ‘Portfolios of the poor’ of D. Collins e.a. This book is based on the diligent assembly of data of money management of households with an income of less than 2 dollars a day. During a year, a large number of households were visted every two weeks, to obtain information on their (problems with) money management. This revealed quite some ‘novel facts’ (which can be used to alleviate the plight of these households). Surprisingly (or, in fact, not surprisingly), this way of assembling data on the behaviour of real people living in real households resembles the way modern marketeers try to assemble data on behaviour of real people living in real households. Let’s skip the outdated, boring, simple, superficial and utterly unmeasurable concepts of homo economicus and utility and start teaching our students (and ourselves) how to investigate the lives of real people. Science does not proceed by fabricating fables and myths – sciences proceeds by the rejection of fables and myths.
(see for a rejection (in fact: evaporating) of the myth of the homo economicus the measurements and their interpretation of the famous neurologists Victor Lamme: ‘De vrije wil bestaat niet’ (Surprisingly to be translated as: ‘There is no such thing as a free choice’), Bert Bakker, Amsterdam, 2010)!
Merijn Knibbe
You have established your street cred. Now how about you convey some of the particulars of the conversation. I imagine it would be quite worthwhile. Cheers.
Did Post-Keynesians do better?
Inside the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank, DNB), post-keynesian ideas are well known. Lex Hoogduin, head of economic research, was a Phd. student of Jan Kregel at the University of Groningen – and might one day possibly be the head of the DNB. In his present position, he won’t call himself a post keynesian (or neo classical or whatever) – but he surely knows what post keynesianism is all about.
Did the DNB do better in predicting the GFC? This is an interesting document (albeit in one of the less well known Germanic dialects, the heatmap is however clear when one knows that the top of the colums should be read as: lax monetary policy/global inbalances with regard to the trade balances/interest too low/increased search for (risky) yield/increasing prices of houses and other assets/financial innovations):
http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/Waarschuwingen%20van%20DNB%20voor%20macro-economische%20onevenwichtigheden_tcm46-229100.pdf
According to the DNB (which is at present severely criticized for the ice save dabacle, among other things) they did warn, they did warn more often and their warnings became increasingly “hot”.
At this moment, the hypothesis that post keynesian ideas played a role in this warnings can not be disproved (though the DNB possibly also tries to ‘sweep its own carpet clean’). Until further investigation, the next conclusions can be drawn:
A. There used to be no glass wall, in the Netherlands
B. Post Keynesian ideas might indeed have done better
P.S. Jan Kregel did spend quite some years at the University of Groningen (in fact, he has been one of my teachers who indeed approved of a heterdox (or should I say: unusual?) macro economics reading list, including neo marxist works in french as well as Cipolla). His years at Groningen are however not mentioned in het CV on the internet.
Merijn Knibbe