Comment of the week: Redefining economics to redefine the economy
from Merijn Knibbe
A comment on Free e-book: “Britain’s Broken Economy – and how to mend it”
Redefining economics to redefine the economy
Once upon a time, economists like Milton Friedman, Gary Becker and Robert Lukas redefined economics with concepts like ‘Permanent Income’, ‘Human Capital’ and ‘Rational Expectations’. There might be some value in at least the first two of these concepts. But it is not just these individual concepts. These (and other) concepts are linked by three common denominators which makes them neo-classical: atomistic man, rational choice and efficient markets. These denominators are, in my view, not needed to define these concepts – but at present they are at the core of it. These concepts, in a less precise shape, are also cornerstones of neo-liberal thinking and are (or were?) even part of what Germans call modern ‘Zeitgeist’, the ‘atmosphere’ of a certain era (there is a surprising similarity between the ‘You can do it if you want it’ individualism part of the new age movement and ‘rational neo classical man). The e-book does a good job when it, implicitely, attacks this ‘Zeitgeist’ by, for instance, stating that job security is not just a ‘rigidity’ which hampers the working of efficient markets – but also a cornerstone of many peoples live. It does not do a good job – in fact: a bad job – when it wants to restrict these ideas to ‘Labour’. The very succes of neo-liberal ‘There is no such thing as society’ economic ideas is partly caused because left wing as well as right wing economists have embraced these ideas. Or, I do dare to state this for my country, they are often not even aware of alternatives. Many Dutch economists are, for instance, probably not able to mention even one Dutch economic historian, have never mastered double entry accounting, are not familiar with National Accounting and know next to nothing of modern consumer studies. Indeed, these are not radical methods, but that’s exactly the point. So called ‘radical’ Post Keynesian ideas are quite consistent with i.e. mainstream modern consumer studies – while neo classical economics are not. It’s not the Post Keynesians (or the Georgists, or…) who are the fringe-thinkers!
When we want to succeed in changing economics for the better, i.e. in the direction of a more real life science which does take account of the importance of social bonds, uncertainty, the difference between labor/entrepreneurial incomes like profit and wages and rentier incomes like rents and bonuses and which recognizes cultural differences we will have to redefine economics again – the individual concepts as well as the ‘worldview’ behind these concepts. As part of my (very) long term goal, ‘Indices of food and housing as indicators of human welfare, 1600 – 2020′ I will try to make a humble contribution to such a redefinition. None of the individual parts are new, all of it is consistent with National Accounting and double entry bookkeeping but the combination of the individual items may be slightly less usual.
1. A redefinition of investing and saving which includes consumer durables.
In National Accounting and Keynesian economics, saving is basically seen as producing something (capital goods, stock) which is used in a later period. The same holds, of course, for consumer durables. As durables are already a seperate item in the consumption statistics, we already know the magnitude of these investments. In Keynesian models, ‘C’ will drop and ‘I’ will rise, just like ‘S’. In fact, houses are already counted as capital and included in ‘I’ and ‘S’. GDP will rise, as well as NDP (consumer durables will be treated the same way as houses). Behind this definition is the idea of the household (read: family) as a producing as well as a consuming unit.
Bos, F. (2003), “The national accounts as a tool for analysis and policy. Past, present and future”. Berkel en Rodenrijs. Especially paragrpah 6.5.
2. Redefining inflation.
The largest single item in the ‘basket’ of goods used to calculate inflation is ‘housing’, including energy and the like. This holds for the USA (thanks, Dean Baker) but, according to the National Accounts, also for the netherlands and, according to the ‘baskets’ used to calculate inflation, also for Germany, the U.K. and France. But not for India. Sideline: a consistent very long term increase in the cost of housing (as well as of the quality of it) might be characteristic for very long term economic growth – but at the moment that’s just a hypothesis). Generally, the ‘price’ of housing is rent, or, for owner occupied dwellings, ‘imputed rent’. The reason why ‘imputed rent’ is used is straightforward: it is closer to a ‘monetary efficient market’ price than costs of housing of an owner occupied house, like interest, write offs and the like. But that’s exactly the problem. Households as a producer which own a house do not operate on a ‘monetary efficient market’ – and our statistics should reflect this. There is no ‘market price’ of house services once the house has been bought, not even a ‘shadow price’ – there are costs (for doubters: calculate the shadow prices for cases where house prices as well as interest rates drop after a house has been bought – do such calculations make sense?).
On this: Mason Gaffney, http://commonground-usa.net/gaffney_1205.htm
3. A ‘long term double entry accounting view of market transactions’.
Market transactions, by definition, have to be booked at the left as well at the right side of the accounts. For a person, this does not make much sense when one buys an icecream. But it does make sense when one buys a house (or a car, or other large items). To be honest: it makes so much sense that the bank every month reminds me of the passiva side of my balance sheet. Money, in the shape of debt, is surely not neutral, just read the Dean Baker op eds on housing. As obvious as this is, the standard ‘supply/demand’ miro economy graphs in fact only show the ‘activa’ side of transactions; liquidity constraints and debts are, in fact, not problematic. These problems are, of course, often added as a ‘complication’ – but should be seen as core elements of demand functions. Demand is not just influenced by the budget and prices – liquidity constraints in combination with ‘live events’ have their own role to play. Some years ago, ‘The Economist’ stated that ‘Bridezilla’ had caused the cost of the average USA wedding to increase to $ 28.000,–. For South Africans, the largest outlay of their lives may well be their funeral (is this at odds with the idea of ‘homo economicus’?). In many societies, dowries cause large liquidity problems – and people are even killed because of these. On a very theoretical level it is important to note that many of these financial problems are not solved, but caused by the existence of money. More practical it is important to note that liquidity as well as income and ‘rights to different kinds of credit’ are important determinants of spending, while these ‘rights to credit’ are continously changed by changing rules as well as changing reputations of certain assests (houses!) as well as people (‘creditworthiness’) (Study loans are of course on the increase as a major ‘liquidity constraint’).
On reputation, credit and consumption: Harm Nijboer, ‘Fashion and the early modern consumer evolution. A theoretical exploration and some evidence from seventeenth century Leeuwarden,’ in: Bruno Blondé, Eugénie Briot, Natacha Coquery & Laura van Aert (eds.), Retailers and consumer changes in Early Modern Europe. England, France, Italy and the Low Countries, Tours: Presses Universitaires François-Rabelais, 2005, pp. 21-36. On cultural differences in costs of ‘life events’ like funerals, marriages, religious feast and the like and liquidity constraints and savings: Collins, D., e.a. (2009), ‘Portfolios of the poor. How the World’s poor live on $2 a day’. Princeton.
Well, these were some ideas, maybe there is some merit to them. The unifying background of these ideas is the household as a producing unit which is embedded in a society and culture – but probably that is clear already.
Merijn.Knibbe@wur.nlMerijn Knibbe1
































I read Mason Gaffney’s piece and I was struck by this sentence:
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Sounds to me like the old Marx line about the pauperization of the working class. Can we really take this kind of argument seriously? I am very skeptical.
Gaffney’s sentence was this one: “To mask the fall of real wage rates. This is supposed to placate working voters. It is supposed to support orators declaiming that our standard of living is ever rising, and we should all feel good. Actually, real wage rates have fallen steadily since peaking in about 1975. That is using the official Consumer Price Index (CPI) to measure rises in the COL. If the CPI understates rises in the COL, real wage rates have fallen even faster than the data show.”
Apparently, using to bracket a quote is a bad idea.
At any rate, in my humble opinion, Gaffney has it all wrong. Can he really deny that at the world level, general prosperity has declined? Maybe international trade is creating a sort of redistribution of wealth where the very poor are getting (slowly) richer while the very rich (us, in the West), get slightly less rich, or get richer at a slower pace. At any rate, it seems undeniable to me that worldwide, living standards are improving. This talk of falling real wages seems like total nonsense when taken out of worldwide context. Gaffney is missing the forest for the tree.
Dear JFV,
thank you for helping me clarify my views.
1. On income.
I suggest that a more ‘household’ oriented view of economics might be usefull: people do live in households (according to the definition including jails etc.). Looking at households and their income sometimes might give a different view of the world than looking at production and ‘the individual’ (see table, the table has a terrible layout but that’s because blogs like this tend to mess up tables – using brackets seems to be no good idea either):
Table 1. Real GDP per capita and real disposable income of households (RDIH) per household (before 1980: total real disposable household per household, 1969 = 100).
GDP/capita
1969 100
1979 140
1989 149
1999 159
2009 165
RDIH/household
1969 100
1979 102
1989 101
1999 112
2009 113
Source: National Accounts of the Netherlands
Both tables tell a (more or less, see 2.) ‘true’ but indeed quite different story – they make my point.
Another question is also interesting: why these differences? Arithmetically, the differences are caused by the number of households growing faster than population (in %), an increasing difference between gross and net, a larger difference between total income and income of households and, for the Netherlands, an increasing surplus on the current account. And yes, this last one means that one reason why GDP in the USA did not decrease too much in 2009 while real income did decrease a lot is the almost overnight shrinking of the deficit (oktober 2008 – January 2009) on the current account from 6% GDP to 3% GDP (these last data are nominal, the fall in oil prices causes the real effect to be somewhat different). This bring us to the interesting question: what caused these arithmetical changes. Answering this requires a book as well as a lot of additional research (why did the Gross/net ratio change? I have no idea, at the moment). But I can make my point: looking at income and households does show us a side of reality that is differs from the usual ‘GDP/capita’ view. Though the ‘real income per household’ variable can be obtained from the National Accounts it is surpising how few economists use it.
Long story short: income of households in the Netherlands is, in 2009, only 13% higher than in 1969, the only period of sustained increase was 1995-2000 and at the moment income per household is lower than in 2000. According to my calculations income per household in the USA did somewhat better – but also much less well than GDP per capita.
When we take into account that income inequality increased this rather small increase (13% in 40 years) means that real income of many households did not increase or even decreased. An increase in welfare may have been less ‘natural’ to our societies than we thought, a thought reinforced by our focus on production and ‘the individual’.
2. But how true are these stories? Can we trust ‘real’ series? Are quality improvements neglected when we divide nominal values with the price level? Cars are surely safer than they were twenty years ago – which is not reflected in many price indices. Gafney is howerver TOTALLY right that we have to tell our students that decreases in quality are also quite common. Gaffney gives a lot of examples of these decreases – a very powerful might also be ‘antibiotics’. But is Gaffney also right when he says that prosperity rises less than is indicated by ‘real’ income? The least we can see about this is that (as sometimes indeed happens) we have to calculate different price indices for different groups: elderly, renters, home owners and the like as far as I know, at this moment and experimentel price index for the elderly is being censtructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Dutch data comprise different estimates for rich and poor households. In the Netherlands, we should also calculate a seperate index for young people, who have to pay four times as much for their house as their parents did thirty and fourty years ago. In my opinion, the question is not yet completely resolved and Gaffney does have a point (there is of course a ‘retoric’ side to his emphasis on deteriorating quality, as he wants to highlight and ignored argument).
On long term changes in real wages, living stadards of once poor societies you might read Robert Fogel: real wages are just one of the variables influencing ‘the biological standard of living’. The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death, 1700-2100: Europe, America, and the Third World. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 189pp. ISBN 0-521-80878-2.
You seem to be saying that we should go back to Kenneth Boulding’s “A Reconstruction of Economics” and the view of populations of real assets in use providing a fund of capabilities.
Merijn: I still believe you have it all wrong on income for the simple reason that the basket of goods consumed in 1969 is completely different from the basket of goods consumed in 2009, and therefore RDIH is a meaningless stat to describe standards of living. A better stat would probably be obesity rates and life expectancy. People are getting fatter, therefore they are richer, and their life expectancy is getting longer, therefore again, they are getting richer (until we reach a physiological limit to life expectancy).
You guys are chasing a ghost and ignoring the real world when you are trying to make the case for pauperization. It just ain’t there.
@ JFV – on measures of welfare: ‘The Economist’of this week contains a very usefull ‘briefing’on the millenium goals which indeed shows that, on average (!!!), the biological standard of living and education is improving in developing countries. It is important to note that this improvement is not just the result of higher wages but also of improving government policies – though there remains a awfull lot to do. Interestingly, the emphasis which The Economist puts on the importance in India of prolonged breast feeding for the health of small children and the detrimental consequences of women which have to return to work very soon after giving birth is in concordance with the historical record in Western countries. RDIH is however not about the biological standard of living, it is about what income can buy. And that did not increase too much, on average.
@Merijn Knibbe
I wrote the original comment on friday, it contains some ‘defuncting’ of Dutch economists. Saying that others do not do too well is of course easy and arrogant. My verdict however seems to have been quite mild. On saturday, the Volkskrant published and interview with Coen Teulings, head of the Centraal Plan Bureau (the most influential economic think tank of the Netherlands). According to him:
1. They did not see the crisis coming (this indeed shows from their preidctions. In June 2008 they still predicted 1,5% growth for 2009)
2. Their models predict such an occurence (2008) ‘only once in a million years’
3. A quote (otherwise you will not believe this, my translation): “we knew next to nothing of monetary economics”.
Again, this is the head of the most important economic think tank of the Netherlands, a man with direct access to the government including the prime minister.
@JFV
Mason Gaffney, a Marxist? He’s a Georgist. He believes that wages (and profits) are squeezed by landowners. I agree, except that I would maintain that only labour earns its return and capitalists as well as landowners expropriate the fruits of labour.