Home > The Economics Profession, The Economy > Explaining stagnation: Why it matters?

Explaining stagnation: Why it matters?

from Thomas Palley

Larry Summers (HERE) and Paul Krugman (HERE) have recently identified the phenomenon of stagnation.  Given that they are giants in today’s economic policy conversation, their views have naturally received enormous attention. That attention is very welcome because the issue is so important. However, there is also a danger that their dominance risks crowding out other explanations of stagnation, thereby short-circuiting debate.

Krugman has long emphasized the liquidity trap – zero lower bound to interest rates which supposedly prevents spending from reaching a level sufficient for full employment. Summers has added to this story by saying we have been in the throes of stagnation for a long while, but that has been obscured by years of serial asset price bubbles.

That is a good start to the conversation, but there are other views that dig deeper regarding the causes of stagnation.  For instance, John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff clearly identify stagnation in their 2009 book The Great Financial Crisis: Causes and Consequences (HERE). They conclude with a section titled “Back to the real economy: the stagnation problem” and they write:

“It was the reality of economic stagnation beginning in the 1970s, as heterodox economists Ricardo Belliofiore and Joseph Halevi have recently emphasized, that led to the emergence of “the new financialized capitalist regime,” a kind of “paradoxical financial Keynesianiasm” whereby demand in the economy was stimulated primarily “thanks to asset-bubbles” (Foster and Magdoff, p.129).”

My own 2009 New America Foundation report, “America’s Exhausted Paradigm: Macroeconomic Causes of the Financial Crisis and Great Recession”, concluded (HERE):

“The bottom line is macroeconomic failure rooted in America’s flawed economic paradigm is the ultimate cause of the financial crisis and Great Recession…. Now, there is a grave danger that policymakers only focus on financial market reform and ignore reform of America’s flawed economic paradigm. In that event, though the economy may stabilize, it will likely be unable to escape the pull of economic stagnation. That is because stagnation is the logical next stage of the existing paradigm.”

That report became a core chapter in my 2012 book, From Financial Crisis to Stagnation, the blurb for which reads (HERE):

“The U.S. economy today is confronted with the prospect of extended stagnation. This book explores why…. Financial deregulation and the house price bubble kept the economy going by making ever more credit available. As the economy cannibalized itself by undercutting income distribution and accumulating debt, it needed larger speculative bubbles to grow. That process ended when the housing bubble burst. The earlier post–World War II economic model based on rising middle-class incomes has been dismantled, while the new neoliberal model has imploded. Absent a change of policy paradigm, the logical next step is stagnation. The political challenge we face now is how to achieve paradigm change.”

The big analytical difference between Foster and Magdoff and myself is that they see stagnation as inherent to capitalism whereas I see it as the product of neoliberal economic policy. Foster and Magdoff partake of the Baran-Sweezy tradition that recommends deeper socialist transformation. I use a structural Keynesian framework that recommends reconstructing the income and demand generation mechanism via policies that include rebuilding worker bargaining power, reforming globalization, and reining in corporations and financial markets.

Larry Summers’ story of serial bubbles delaying stagnation has substantial similarities with both accounts but he avoids blaming either capitalism or neoliberalism. That is hardly surprising as Summers has been a chief architect of the neoliberal system and remains committed to it, though he now wants to soften its impact. Instead, he appeals to the black box of “secular stagnation” as ultimate cause and suggests fiscal policies that would ameliorate the demand shortage problem. However, those policies would not remedy the root cause of stagnation as they leave the economic architecture unchanged.

Though Summers and Krugman are relative late-comers to the stagnation hypothesis, they have still done a great public service by drawing attention to it. Now that stagnation has been identified, the real debate can begin.

The questions are what caused stagnation and what must be done to restore shared prosperity? There is no guarantee we will answer those questions correctly (my prior is mainstream economists will continue their track record of getting it wrong). But it is absolutely certain we will not get the right answer if we do not ask the right question. So thank you Larry Summers and Paul Krugman for putting stagnation on the table. Let the debate begin.

  1. Victoria Chick
    February 26, 2014 at 3:30 pm

    I would respectfilly point out that I raised this prospect in 1978 (Keynes’ Theory, Keynesian Policy and the Post-War Inflation, British Review of Economic Issues 1, November 1978, 1-24, reprinted under its original title, ‘Inflation from a longer-term perpective’ in P. Arestis and S. C. Dow Eds, On Money, Macro and Keynes: Selected Essays by Victoria Chick, , Macmillan) and in the present context in .2009 http://www.hetecon.net/documents/ConferencePapers/2009Non-Refereed/ChickStudart.pdf

  2. BC
    February 26, 2014 at 3:44 pm

    Causes of “stagnation”, i.e., secular debt-deflationary, slow-motion depression akin to the 1830s-40s, 1880s-90s, 1930s-40s, and Japan since the 1990s:

    Record level of private debt to GDP and wages.

    Peak Boomer demographic drag effects.

    Peak Oil (falling global crude oil extraction per capita since 2005 at the average $85 oil since).

    Extreme wealth and income concentration to the top 0.1-1% to 10% of households hoarding overvalued financial assets at no velocity, resulting in collapsing money velocity.

    Record low returns to labor’s share of GDP owing to offshoring, financialization, feminization, etc.

    There are no conventional supply-side, Keynesian, Monetarist, socialist, or communist prescriptions for an economy with too much debt to GDP and wages, once-in-history demographic drag effects, and falling costly supply per capita of the primary energy source.

    The only solution is debt forgiveness, pay down, default, or some combination in a fashion timely enough to restart growth of private investment, employment, and wages at a much slower trend rate per capita versus the long-term 2% rate.

    Inflating away debt will risk accelerating price inflation and further destroy the after-tax purchasing power of labor.

    Labor must receive a disproportionately larger share of output hereafter compared to capital’s share than has occurred since the 1980s, especially moer than parasitic financial capital’s take. Rather than tax away the income and financial wealth of the top 0.1-1% to fund costly gov’t redistribution schemes, it would be better to provide tax incentives/credits for this group to start small businesses that hire people, private employment pools or associations, or retain people as personal staff for a socially acceptable minimum subsistence income that the gov’t could subsidize.

    The top 1% in the US has $20 trillion in financial wealth and receives $2.5 trillion in income. The next 9% have $22 trillion and receive more than $3 trillion, leaving the bottom 90% with the remaining 15% of wealth and 50% of income. With over $40 trillion in financial wealth held by as few as 12 million US households, something must be done to encourage circulation of a necessary share of the more than $40 trillion in hoarded, no-velocity deferred investment and household consumption.

  3. February 26, 2014 at 4:47 pm

    As one just above the median income bracket, I’m loosing my patients with pontificating know-it-all’s (Summers, Krugman) who clearly don’t. I’m not saying they aren’t smart and educated, just that they do not know it all. Moreover, when they “blow the call” and propose “solutions” that don’t work, they receive no pain, where is the skin in the game?

    Clearly, Victoria picked this up some time ago (thank you for the citing, nicely done), and BC just put things more succinctly than I’ve seen in some time. Here’s the drill, it’s time Economists stop trying to impress one another and start trying to impress folks like me.

    Assume for a moment Physicians behaved like Economists. If a child would show up in the Emergency Room in severe abdominal pain and high fever, we would huddle and argue nuance for a couple hours, then the person with the loudest voice (biggest pen) would rush the child to the OR, cut open her belly before understanding the problem. Later as the child lay dying and we would conclude that the problem was something else and blame the child, i.e. quality of the data.

    This I know, every time the government tries to fix the economy I become poorer. //t.coss, RN

  4. March 17, 2014 at 4:52 am

    Krugman and Summers receive more credit than they are due for recognizing the obvious. There is a great danger that they may do more damage by producing half-measures that do not work. That is, we can imagine a demand-side stimulus as coming out of their ideology, but no real or radical remedy to the problem of debt. Demand-side stimulus will not work on its own. When it fails, as it would, being only partial, it may take down the whole solution that could be effected by combining demand-side with financial triage

  1. No trackbacks yet.

Leave a comment

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.