Home > New vs. Old Paradigm > ‘Fundamental assumptions’ in economics — a matter of nonsense

‘Fundamental assumptions’ in economics — a matter of nonsense

from Lars Syll

It is, perhaps, not uninteresting to point to some of the economic implications which are included in “perfect foresight”. It will immediately be recognized that this assumption could never lie at the basis of the theory of equilibrium, and they who attribute this to such authors as Walras and Pareto, who are included as representatives of equilibrium theory, are in error. ln the first place, strange to say, it happens that even material assertions can be made about such an economy on the basis of the assumption of perfect foresight.They are fundamentally of the negative type. For example, no lotteries or gambling will exist, for who would play if it were well-established where the profit went? Telephone, telegraph, newspapers, bills, posters, etc. would, likewise, be superfluous, obviously; but, also, the very important industries, based on them, with all their affiliated industries, would be absent. Only packages and letters implying documentary evidence would need to be delivered by post, for to whom would letters be written? The tale need not be carried further, for it is obvious how little considered are the “fundamental assumptions” so frequently employed in theoretical economics, where really a matter of nonsense is at issue.

morgensternOskar Morgenstern

 

 

 

 

 

  1. davetaylor1
    May 3, 2014 at 9:49 am

    Morgenstern is here taking Bertrand Russell’s solution to his famous paradox: “the set of all sets is nonsense”. Actually it isn’t nonsense. It later turned out to be a pointer to indexes which, even if you know them, have to be constructed before they exist, communicated and saved before one has them, and followed before you get to their meaning in one’s own experience. The “all” is to mathematical logic what “infinity” is to numerical mathematics, and Cantor proved that there are different kinds of infinity, but by definition the word ‘infinity’ is unscoped, whereas the logical “all” is limited by its context. Thus there is all the knowledge in my own head, and this will be different from that in other people’s head, and even if it provided perfect verbal foreknowledge about our world, my ability to imaginatively reconstruct its meaning into foresight sufficiently well to act on it depends on my experience and ability, and clearly becomes unreliable in old age. So yes, Morgenstein is rightly objecting to economic theorists assuming perfect perception, but with more perfect perception of the meaning of ‘perfect foresight’, all the negative consequences he points to would be seen to be actually the conditions of our being as good at things as we are.

    “Not uninteresting”?

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