Home > Greece > As it happened – Yanis Varoufakis’ intervention during the 27th June 2015 Eurogroup Meeting

As it happened – Yanis Varoufakis’ intervention during the 27th June 2015 Eurogroup Meeting

from Yanis Varoufakis

The Eurogroup Meeting of 27th June 2015 will not go down as a proud moment in Europe’s history. Ministers turned down the Greek government’s request that the Greek people should be granted a single week during which to deliver a Yes or No answer to the institutions’ proposals – proposals crucial for Greece’s future in the Eurozone. The very idea that a government would consult its people on a problematic proposal put to it by the institutions was treated with incomprehension and often with disdain bordering on contempt. I was even asked: “How do you expect common people to understand such complex issues?”. Indeed, democracy did not have a good day in yesterday’s Eurogroup meeting! But nor did European institutions. After our request was rejected, the Eurogroup President broke with the convention of unanimity (issuing a statement without my consent) and even took the dubious decision to convene a follow up meeting without the Greek minister, ostensibly to discuss the “next steps”.

Can democracy and a monetary union coexist? Or must one give way? This is the pivotal question that the Eurogroup has decided to answer by placing democracy in the too-hard basket. So far, one hopes.

Intervention by Yanis Varoufakis, 27th June 2015 Eurogroup Meeting


In our last meeting (25th June) the institutions tabled their final offer to the Greek authorities, in response to our proposal for a Staff Level Agreement (SLA) as tabled on 22nd June (and signed by Prime Minister Tsipras). After long, careful examination, our government decided that, unfortunately, the institutions’ proposal could not be accepted. In view of how close we have come to the 30th June deadline, the date when the current loan agreement expires, this impasse of grave concern to us all and its causes must be thoroughly examined.

We rejected the institutions’ 25th June proposals because of a variety of powerful reasons. The first reason is the combination of austerity and social injustice they would impose upon a population devastated already by… austerity and social injustice. Even our own SLA proposal (22nd June) is austerian, in a bid to placate the institutions and thus come closer to an agreement. Only our SLA attempted to shift the burden of this renewed austerian onslaught to those more able to afford it – e.g. by concentrating on increasing employer contributions to pension funds rather than on reducing the lowest of pensions. Nonetheless, even our SLA contains many parts that Greek society rejects.

So, having pushed us hard to accept substantial new austerity, in the form of absurdly large primary surpluses (3.5% of GDP over the medium term, albeit somewhat lower than the unfathomable number agreed to by previous Greek governments – i.e. 4.5%), we ended up having to make recessionary trade-offs between, on the one hand, higher taxes/charges in an economy where those who pay their dues pay through the nose and, on the other, reductions in pensions/benefits in a society already devastated by massive cuts in basic income support for the multiplying needy.

Let me say colleagues what we had already conveyed to the institutions on 22nd June, as we were tabling our own proposals: Even this SLA, the one we were proposing, would be extremely onerous to pass through Parliament, given the level of recessionary measures and austerity it entailed. Unfortunately, the institutions’ response was to insist on even more recessionary (aka parametric) measures (e.g. increasing VAT on hotels from 6% to 23%!) and, worse still, on shifting the burden massively from business to the weakest members of society (e.g. to reduce the lowest of pensions, to remove support for farmers, to postpone ad infinitum legislation that offers some protection to badly exploited workers).

The institutions new proposals, as expressed in their 25th June SLA/Prior Actions document, would make a politically problematic package – from the perspective of our Parliament – into a package that would extremely difficult to push through our Parliamentary caucus. But this is not all. It gets worse much worse than that once we take a look at the proposed financing package.

What makes it impossible to pass the institutions’ proposal through Parliament is the lack of an answer to the question: Will these painful measures at least give us a period of tranquillity during which to carry out the agreed reforms and measures? Will a shock of optimism counter the recessionary effect of the extra fiscal consolidation that is being imposed on a country that has been in recession for 21 consecutive quarters? The answer is clear: No, the institutions’ proposal is offering no such prospect.

This is why: The proposed funding for the next 5 months (see below for a breakdown) is problematic in a variety of ways:

First, it makes no provision for the state’s arrears, caused by five months of making payments without disbursements and of falling tax revenues as a result of the constant threat of Grexit that has been wafting in the air, so to speak.

Secondly, the idea of cannibalising the HFSF in order to repay the ECB’s SMP-era bonds constitutes a clear and present danger: These monies were earmarked, correctly, for strengthening Greece’s fragile banks, possibly through an operation that deals with their mountainous NPLs that eat into their capitalisation. The answer I have been given by senior ECB officials, whose name will remain unsaid, is that, if need be, the HFSF will be replenished to cope with the banks’ capitalisation needs. And who will do the replenishing? The ESM, is the answer I was given. But, and this is a gigantic but, this is not part of the proposed deal and, moreover, it could not be part of the deal as the institutions have no mandate to commit the ESM in this manner – as I am sure Wolfgang will remind us all. And, moreover, if such a new arrangement could be made, why then is our sensible, moderate, proposal of a new ESM facility for Greece that helps shift SMP liability from the ECB to the ESM not discussed? The answer “we will not discuss it because we will not discuss it” will be very hard for me to convey to my Parliament, together with another package of austerity.

Thirdly, the proposed disbursements’ schedule is a minefield of reviews – one per month – that will ensure two things. First, that the Greek government will be immersed every day, every week in the review process for five long months. And well before these five months expire, we shall enter into another tedious negotiation over the next program – since there is nothing in the institutions’ proposal capable of inspiring even the faintest of hopes that at the end of this new extension Greece can stand on its own two feet.

Fourthly, given that it is abundantly clear that our debt will remain unsustainable by the end of the year, and that market access will remain as distant then as it is now, the IMF cannot be counted upon to disburse its share, the 3.5 billion that the institutions are counting as part of the funding package on the table.

These are solid reasons why our government does not consider it has a mandate to accept the institutions’ proposal or to use its majority in Parliament in order to push it through and onto the statutes.

At the same time, we do not have a mandate to turn down the institutions’ proposals either, cognizant of the critical moment in history we find ourselves in. Our party received 36% of the vote and the government as a whole commanded a little more than 40%. Fully aware of how weighty our decision is, we feel obliged to put the institutions’ proposal to the people of Greece. We shall endeavour to spell out to them fully what a Yes to the Institutions’ Proposal means, to do the same regarding a No vote, and then let them decide. For our part we shall accept the people’s verdict and will do whatever it takes to implement it – one way or another.

Some worry that a Yes vote would be a vote of no confidence in our government (as we shall be recommending a No vote), in which case we cannot promise to the Eurogroup that we shall be in a position to sign and implement the agreement with the institutions. This is not so. We are committed democrats. If the people gives us a clear instruction to sign up on the institutions’ proposals, we shall do whatever it takes to do so – even if it means a reconfigured government.

Colleagues, the referendum solution is optimal for all, given the constraints we face.

  • If our government were to accept the institutions’ offer today, promising to push it through Parliament tomorrow, we would be defeated in Parliament with the result of a new election being called within a very long month – then, the delay, the uncertainty and the prospects of a successful resolution would be much, much diminished
  • But even if we managed to pass the institutions’ proposal through Parliament, we would be facing a major problem of ownership and implementation. Put simply, just as in the past the governments that pushed through policies dictated by the institutions could not carry the people with them, we too would fail to do so.

On the question that will be put to the Greek people, much has been said about what it should be. Many of you tell us, advise us, instruct us even, that we should make it a Yes or No question on the euro. Let me be clear on this. First, the question was formulated by the Cabinet and has just been passed through Parliament – and it is “Do you accept the institutions’ proposal as it was presented to us on 25th June in the Eurogroup?” This is the only pertinent question. If we had accepted that proposal two days ago, we would have had a deal. The Greek government is now asking the electorate to answer the question you put it to me Jeroen – especially when you said, and I quote, “you can consider this, if you wish, a take or leave it proposal”. Well, this is how we took it and we are now honouring the institutions and the Greek people by asking the latter to deliver a clear answer on the institutions’ proposal.

To those who say that, effectively, this is a referendum on the euro, my answer is: You may very well say this but I shall not comment. This is your judgement, your opinion, your interpretation. Not ours! There is a logic to your view but only if there is an implicit threat that a No from the Greek people to the institutions’ proposal will be followed up by moves to eject Greece, illegally, out of the euro. Such a threat would not be consistent with basic principles of European democratic governance and European Law.

To those who instruct us to phrase the referendum question as a euro-drachma dilemma, my answer is crystal clear: European Treaties make provisions for an exit from the EU. They do not make any provisions for an exit from the Eurozone. With good reason, of course, as the indivisibility of our Monetary Union is part of its raison d’ etre. To ask us to phrase the referendum question as a choice involving exit from the Eurozone is to ask us to violate EU Treaties and EU Law. I suggest to anyone who wants us, or anyone else, to hold a referendum on EMU membership to recommend a change in the Treaties.


It is time to take stock. The reason we find ourselves in the present conundrum is one: Our government’s primary proposal to you and the institutions, which I articulated here in the Eurogroup in my first ever intervention, was never taken seriously. It was the suggestion that common ground be created between the prevailing MoU and our new government’s program. For a fleeting moment, the 20th February Eurogroup statement raised the prospect of such common ground – as it made no reference to the MoU and concentrated on a new reform list by our government that would be put to the institutions.

Regrettably, immediately after the 20th of February the institutions, and most of colleagues in this room, sought to bring the MoU back to the centre, and to reduce our role in marginal changes within the MoU. It is as if we were told, to paraphrase Henry Ford, that we could have any reform list, any agreement, as long as it was the MoU. Common ground was thus sacrificed in favour of imposing upon our government a humiliating retreat. This is my view. But it is not important now. Now it is up to the Greek people to decide.

Our task, in today’s Eurogroup, ought to be to pave the ground for a smooth passage to the referendum of 5th July. This means one thing: that our loan agreement be extended by a few weeks so that the referendum takes place in conditions of tranquillity. Immediately after 5th July, if the people have voted Yes, the institutions’ proposal will be signed. Until then, during the next week, as the referendum approaches, any deviation from normality, especially in the banking sector, will be invariably interpreted as an attempt to coerce Greek voters. Greek society has paid a hefty price, through huge fiscal contraction, in order to be part of our monetary union. But a democratic monetary union that threatens a people about to deliver their verdict with capital controls and bank closures is a contradiction in terms. I would like to think that the Eurogroup will respect this principle. As for the ECB, the custodian on our monetary stability and of the Union itself, I have no doubt that, if the Eurogroup takes a responsible decision today to accept the request for an extension of our loan agreement that I am now tabling, it will do what it takes to give the Greek people a few more days to express their opinion.

Colleagues, these are critical moments and the decisions we make are momentous. In years to come we may well be asked “Where were you on the 27th of June? And what did you do to avert what happened? At the very least we should be able to say that: We gave the people who live under the worst depression a chance to consider their options. We tried democracy as a means of breaking a deadlock. And we did what it took to give them a few days to do so.

POSTSCRIPT – The day the Eurogroup President broke with the tradition of unanimity and excluded Greece from a Eurogroup gathering at will

Following my intervention (see above) the Eurogroup President rejected our request for an extension, with the support of the rest of the members, and announced that the Eurogroup would be issuing a statement placing the burden of this impasse on Greece and suggesting that the 18 ministers (that is the 19 Eurozone finance ministers except the Greek minister) reconvene later to discuss ways and means of protecting themselves from the fallout.

At that point I asked for legal advice, from the secretariat, on whether a Eurogroup statement can be issued without the conventional unanimity and whether the President of the Eurogroup can convene a meeting without inviting the finance minister of a Eurozone member-state. I received the following extraordinary answer: “The Eurogroup is an informal group. Thus it is not bound by Treaties or written regulations. While unanimity is conventionally adhered to, the Eurogroup President is not bound to explicit rules.” I let the reader comment on this remarkable statement.

For my part, I concluded as follows:

Colleagues, refusing to extend the loan agreement for a few weeks, and for the purpose of giving the Greek people an opportunity to deliberate in peace and quiet on the institutions’ proposal, especially given the high probability that they will accept these proposals (contrary to our government’s advice), will damage permanently the credibility of the Eurogroup as a democratic decision making body comprising partner states sharing not only a common currency but also common values.


  1. graccibros
    June 29, 2015 at 7:08 pm

    Well, the European Union institutional response is the intellectual, fiscal and financial equivalent of the old practice of breaking the “criminal” upon the wheel. That’s the term that came to mind.

    I’ve been following the Greed tragedy for years now, and the two (at least) major postings Yanis Varoufakis had made at Naked Capitalism. Without having ever met, our intellectual paths have been remarkably similar, crossing with the work of M.I. Finley and even, of all places, “Hellfire Nation” the American Protestant (and some Catholics, not the current Pope to be sure, who is clearly a social democrat.) version of breaking individuals on the individual wheel even as the societal/economic ones careens out of control and runs over millions.

    With that being said, the Greek government needs to prepare detailed plans for leaving the Euro zone, and, in essence, carrying out as a game plan, a very difficult one, what Richard Smith has sketched out in a more general way for the West in “Green Capitalism: The God That Failed.” In some senses this will clearly carry the Greek people backward in time, and more will have to be engaged in agriculture, not less, reversing the historic and time honored “road to modernization trends” but is there another country which offers better chances to generate all its power from alternative sources than one with abundant sunshine, wind from the seas, islands and mountains?

    Hey, Gar Alperovitz, here’s your chance to participate in your grand experiment of de-centralization, de-industrialization and participatory economic democracy – just under a lot more duress with much more on the line than the thought lines of the tenured professoriate…

    So the stakes are high, the conditions brutal. The Old Man and the Sea, the great fish has been caught, is being towed, and the sharks are closing in. Human endurance in the face of the horrific, the face of European neoliberalism.

    Thanks for hanging in there Yanis; now the hard part begins.

  2. graccibros
    June 29, 2015 at 10:44 pm

    Oh well, I guess I have to pick up the slack here. It is really worth a visit, economists, to Yves Smith’s long piece at Naked Capitalism today, which headlines the shaky gap -huge gap – between Greek depositors’ accounts and what is available in “deposit insurance.” From any source, internal or European institutional.

    Yves is very critical of Tsiperas and Varoufakis, claiming the point of this vote has been already foreclosed by the facts left on the bargaining table. She also berates Yanis for not seeing that his gambling bluffing stance all along in the negotiations (if indeed that is what he has been playing) would lead to this end result, handicapped at 85% chance of having to leave the Euro and the Union…Mohamed El-Arian is the handicapper at the race track…one not given to flighty pronouncements she points out.

    My comment is this: I find it inconceivable that the man who wrote the complex, learned essays I read, that is the Greek Finance Minister, two years ago and carried at the Naked Capitalism site, and who wrote a very learned and plausible critique of Piketty’s work from the left, does not have a game plan for the outcome I have said was always likely – believing too much in his power to bluff and in the change of heart by neoliberalism. Who knows, maybe she is right, but I look at this man and his ideas and I still find it hard to believe that he would be surprised and caught off guard by such an outcome. And not be fully intellectually and policy prepared to face what I only hinted at in my parable of the “Old Man and the Sea.”

  3. June 30, 2015 at 2:06 am

    Momentous times are the artesian well of great thinking. July fifth may be first light in the dawning of Aquarius. Democracy used knowingly to focus distributed human intelligence, Greece bring us to the next step in evolution of democracy. Awesome. Don’t stop. Thank you.

  4. Larry Motuz
    June 30, 2015 at 4:21 am

    The idea that loaning money is absolutely riskless to those making the loans is basically the position of the Eurogroup. That means that they are transferring their risks, imposing catastrophic losses on average Greek citizens, most of whom never made those loans nor necessarily benefited from them.

    I am with Greece. Democratic institutions are more important than financial ones, especially when the financial ones are playing the games they are currently playing.

  5. June 30, 2015 at 11:50 am

    The double crisis and the real question
    Comment on ‘As it happened – Yanis Varoufakis’ intervention during the 27th June 2015 Eurogroup Meeting’

    Economics has invariably two aspects: political and scientific. With regard to the breakdown of negotiations an outside observer cannot say who has failed or who was successful because one does not really know the true motives of the two sides. As always in politics, this is open to anybody’s guess/paranoia.

    The underlying problem is that what is essentially an economic issue has with some inner necessity shifted into a different frame of reference, that of Hollywood, drama, tragedy, entertainment, soap opera, Circus Maximus. The economic issue has been reformulated in terms of good guys vs. bad guys. Thereby it has become insoluble.

    The format-shift characteristically results in descriptions of the situation like this: “So the stakes are high, the conditions brutal. The Old Man and the Sea, the great fish has been caught, is being towed, and the sharks are closing in. Human endurance in the face of the horrific, the face of European neoliberalism.” (see graccibros above; I am still waiting for the more appropriate crash scene of Alexis Sorbas)

    With this, of course, we are entirely out of economics — at least as far as it claims to be a science — and in the communicative kindergarten. The laws of showbiz rule.

    The political issue is this: if you want your money back it is, first of all, not such a good idea to economically cripple the debtor.

    The economic issue is this: The Greek crisis can be seen as the inevitable result of false economic theory.

    Orthodoxy says the price mechanism sees to it that the economy tends always to efficiency and full employment. Keynesianism says the price mechanism obviously does not work as promised and because of this deficit spending is needed in case of emergency. However, when deficit spending has run up the hill of debt for some time the advice becomes less and less convincing. It seems that all that Keynesianism can achieve is a postponement of the breakdown of an economic system that has a fundamental defect.

    The real question then is: can the market system work without a steadily growing debt? And it is only secondary whether private or public households are the deficit spenders.

    If the answer is No then it is only a question of time that a debt crisis must occur and Greece had the misfortune to be the weakest part of the global debt engine. Under this broader perspective we have no Greek crisis but a systemic crisis (2015).

    Therefore, the crucial question is: can the world economy as a whole work without ever growing debt? Both, Walrasian and Keynesian economics cannot answer this question.

    Because of this, the Greek crisis is not only a political crisis of the EU but the indisputable proof of the failure of economics as a science. To solve this crisis economics has to get out of showbiz first. It is high time for both orthodox and heterodox economists to figure out how the monetary economy works.

    Egmont Kakarot-Handtke

    Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015). Major Defects of the Market Economy. SSRN Working
    Paper Series, 2624350: 1–40. URL

    • Larry Motuz
      June 30, 2015 at 6:19 pm

      I am reading your reconstruction of macroeconomics. Am at the library right now and don’t have it in front of me, but there is a typo in equation 7 I think. Nor have I completed reading it.

      I don’t agree with the view that economics as a science can be developed out of fewer premises. Though you have fewer assumptions– and though you do make some absolutely valid points about the difference between real and nominal values — and though the reduced model you pose [with one output, one wage, hours of labor being used as a proxy for their services] does clarify, it still assumes too much. For instance, what labor offers is itself a product of labor that cannot be proxied by hours of work even when assuming homogeneous workers. Thus, your model, even on such a strong assumption, has a ‘hidden’ product which is what labor is selling to be used in production.

      Similarly, you bring into your model (as far as I have read) a ‘hidden’ but always neoclassical assumption: namely, that money itself is itself not a commodity but merely an abstract unit of account in which the exchange values (nominal always in monetized economic exchange systems), which is, ironically, an assumption about the neutrality of money which flies in the face of your own distinctions between what’s real and what’s nominal and the complex relationship between these.

      Anyway, these are just first thoughts.

  6. graccibros
    June 30, 2015 at 6:22 pm

    I guess, in a democracy, even the students in a “communicative kindergarten” get to raise their hands; I’m raising mine now to defend Hemingway’s “The Old Man and the Sea” as a realistic portrayal, bumped up to the societal level, of the brutal choices Greeks face either way, in or out of the Union. In the short run, choices and pain may be higher in leaving the Union, and any angle the sharks have – the financial players: hedge funds, major power based banks…and so forth, have to strip assets away – they will try to execute. Other sharks, the upper reaches of Greek society, can’t be counted on either to help. But certainly the choices, as I indicated, and the pathway out, are not unexplored by the green left, since they have been leaning towards decentralization of power and agriculture for a long time. Leaving gives their exploration an added touch of realism born out of desperation and the reality that most of the commercial ties to the rest of Europe will be severed or severely strained in the short run, including tourism, which can and must be preserved.

    To add to the “post-graduate” realism of my commentary, Egmont, please consider the following notes from American economics Professor Robert Pollin, along the same lines, but directed towards Podemos in Spain: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/22/spain-anti-austerity-podemos-green-energy-plan

    In many ways, neoliberalism both here in America and Europe, in its austerity policies, manages to combine the worst deprivations of the Protestant Ethic and the stark realities of Jack London’s naturalism…the Old Man and the Sea was a glimpse into this, linked to all the images I’ve seen of hard-up, on the street pensioners in Greece, and Yanis V’s listing in his notes to one of his essays of the America book “Hellfire Nation,” where the choice is who do we blame when things go wrong, the individual or the system, or in the European sense now, a nation with “bad habits.” By the way, many reform educators stress the importance of pre-school and “K” for alternative ways of thinking and learning, but I understand why an economist might reach for that put down. Used to it, and happy to give it back to you in spades.

    • June 30, 2015 at 9:07 pm

      Thank you for the link to Pollin and Podemos in Spain. I can agree with all this, it’s applied economic common sense.

      I do not agree with the substitution of economics by literature or journalism or blather. While I understand that you want to give words to your concerns and help the Greek people, that’s not what makes a good economist. The economist’s way of contributing to a better world is to develop the correct economic theory because at this very moment neither general equilibrium theory nor Post Keynesianism can explain how the actual economy works. So effective measures are a matter of luck. As Keynes put it:

      “Insufficiency of cleverness, not of goodness, is the main trouble.” Blogquote, http://econospeak.blogspot.de/2015/05/keynes-hadnt-got-round-to-it.html

      • June 30, 2015 at 9:40 pm

        There is another way to look at what economics is. Imagine human economics to be as complex as the cosmos or the living body. Then the job of the economist can also be something more like a cross between a doctor and a farmer.

        What we are watching play out in Greece has very little economists can contribute to. How to employ the unemployed to supply the necessities of life without borrowing a penny while corporatism concentrates on crushing sovereignty and imposing austerity.

        My guess is there are 10 – 15% of strong, intelligent Greeks who would jump at the chance to farm food for the emergency.

      • July 1, 2015 at 11:28 am

        Indeed, there are many ways to look at the economy as there are many ways to look at Nature. But unlike physicists economists have not yet found the right way. Both, Walrasianism and Keynesianism have been refuted on either logical or empirical grounds. So economists have nothing to offer but opinions that lack any deeper understanding of how the actual economy works. Do not expect that the Greeks find your advice to turn to gardening particularly brilliant.

      • July 1, 2015 at 2:30 pm

        There are just two ways of looking at Nature: as an energy system or as an information system (where the second includes the first). Economics is still leading us astray because it is still viewed via the paradigm of Newton (direction neglected) rather than that of Shannon.

        On BBC news today Paul Kirby’s story, featuring the Greek debt crisis, contains the essence of the solution to not just the Greek but the European debt crisis: honest money.

        “Capital controls are already in place to stop money flooding out of Greece. A parallel currency to the euro could operate with civil servants paid with IOUs. But few economists see that as workable”.

        Most economists have disqualified themselves from serious consideration by their 17th century political assumptions (identifying the nation with its sovereign) and 19th century trade theories, which ever since have led politicians into a garden of roses unprepared for its thorns.

        Nor is the problem just paying civil servants: it is more about paying pensioners whose real incomes from pre-earned IOU’s have been stolen by gamblers with their own and business IOU’s (shares) unnecessary claiming still more unearned IOU’s from the businesses which pre-earn them. When one examines the facts and how banks from the IMF down, and stock market gamblers, are able to create billions of $ with the stroke of a pen, the whole system already works on IOU’s. It fails to work as a result of idle usurers not earning but allowed to claim repayments.

        Paul’s parallel IOU currency, then, will work subject to the discipline of the credit card system. In this capital controls are built in: one’s debts are one’s own. A Greek individual, business or government department wishing to trade with the IOU would have to sell in euros as much as it bought, but could buy in drachmas the wealth that has already been produced – just so long as it continued to be produced.

        Back in 1978 and 1987 the BBC ran and published a splendid series with Bryan Magee on “Men of Ideas” and “The Great Philosophers”. Even then these displayed no awareness of the existence of post-1948 Information Science (which can resolve many of the issues discussed) nor of the distinctive Catholic Christian viewpoint (which here is extremely relevant to the difference between the original EEC and the current EU). But would they had such a forum today.

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