. . . an economy is always in one of four possible states depending on the presence or absence of lenders (savers) and borrowers (investors). They are as follows: (1) both lenders and borrowers are present in sufficient numbers, (2) there are borrowers but not enough lenders even at high interest rates, (3) there are lenders but not enough borrowers even at low interest rates, and (4) both lenders and borrowers are absent. These four states are illustrated in Exhibit 2.
Of the four, only Cases 1 and 2 are discussed in traditional economics, which implicitly assumes there are always borrowers as long as real interest rates can be brought low enough. And of these two, only Case 1 requires a minimum of policy intervention – such as slight adjustments to interest rates – to keep the economy going.
The causes of Case 2 (insufficient lenders) may be found in both financial and non-financial factors. Non-financial factors might include a culture that does not encourage saving or a country that is simply too poor and underdeveloped to save. A restrictive monetary policy may also qualify as a non-financial factor that weighs on savers’ ability to lend. (If the paradox of thrift leaves a country too poor to save, this would be classified as Case 3 or 4 because it is actually due to a lack of borrowers.)
Financial factors weighing on lenders might include an excess of many non-performing loans (NPLs), which depresses banks’ capital ratios and prevents them from lending. This is what is typically called a credit crunch. Read more…
from Peter Radford
This is not a time to dwell on the inconsistencies and even contradictions of the recent uprising of populism in the western world. Treat it as a fact. It just is. For there can be no mistaking the trend: people, large numbers of people, in a large swathe of Europe and America really are unhappy with their lot in life. Really unhappy. Fully 52% of Republican supporters of Donald Trump tell pollsters that they are angry with the way the country is going. Not just unhappy or disappointed, but angry. Anger leads to really bad political decision making. It is not a constituent of reasoned argument. It leads too quickly to rash thought and even to hatred.
One theme that emerges from this populist moment is the identification of immigration as a source of concern. No, not just concern, but of deep unease. People in both the UK and the US can be heard demanding that they “get their country back”. Leaders in both nations have lamentably failed to identify the importance of immigration as a lightening rod for malaise. Nor have they reacted with anything sensible as policy.
Here in America the reason most often given for the failure to deal with immigration is the gridlock in Washington. It is impossible to begin a conversation about immigration policy because the pre-existing political positions are so well laid out and well established that any talk leads immediately to a conformation of gridlock. So stasis abounds and people get more and more impatient.
The same goes for economic policy. This is what interests me most of course. The failure of economics is breath-taking. Read more…
from Lars Syll
Almost a century and a half after Léon Walras founded neoclassical general equilibrium theory, economists still have not been able to show that markets move economies to equilibria. What we do know is that — under very restrictive assumptions — unique Pareto-efficient equilibria do exist.
But what good does that do? As long as we cannot show, except under exceedingly unrealistic assumptions, that there are convincing reasons to suppose there are forces which lead economies to equilibria – the value of general equilibrium theory is nil. As long as we cannot really demonstrate that there are forces operating — under reasonable, relevant and at least mildly realistic conditions — at moving markets to equilibria, there cannot really be any sustainable reason for anyone to pay any interest or attention to this theory. A stability that can only be proved by assuming “Santa Claus” conditions is of no avail. Most people do not believe in Santa Claus anymore. And for good reasons. Santa Claus is for kids.
Continuing to model a world full of agents behaving as economists — “often wrong, but never uncertain” — and still not being able to show that the system under reasonable assumptions converges to equilibrium (or simply assume the problem away), is a gross misallocation of intellectual resources and time.
In case you think this verdict is only a heterodox idiosyncrasy, here’s what one of the world’s greatest microeconomists — Alan Kirman — writes in his thought provoking paper The intrinsic limits of modern economic theory: Read more…
Today’s Neoliberalism had nearly silenced serious left dissent by the late 1990s, or successfully isolated it in remote academic corners. Bill Clinton’s two terms in the 1990s are proof of that. And there is the continuing tension between Neoliberal economics and democracy: notice the desperate, barely concealed attempt by the Republican Right to shrink the franchise, using as one of its main levers the racial stigmas from “The Great Incarceration” and the yet to be proven accusations of voter fraud.
This political “shunning” of the left happens even in the supposedly liberal Ivy League. The late political theorist Sheldon Wolin (1922-2015), shortly before his death, in an interview with Chris Hedges, spoke of the silent treatment he was given by the faculty at Princeton University when he placed a copy of his new magazine “Democracy” on the faculty lounge coffee table. He was shunned. Perhaps they did not like where he was going with his last book, or could see it coming much earlier: Democracy Inc.: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism (2008). Here is that interview, Segment Seven from a nine part series at the RealNewsNetwork.
Modern economic thought, and practice, since the 1970s, has witnessed a growing crescendo of Market Utopianism – the “purer the better” – is still the rallying cry of the Republican Right, even in the wake of the sobering events of 2008-2009 and despite some professional economists making substantial dents in the pretentions. And if you had any doubts about that, then you haven’t been watching the Republican Presidential Primary debates of 2015-2016, or the sheer destructive obstructionism of its behavior towards President Obama as shamefully displayed in Congress. In its deliberate jamming of the democratic process itself, the Republican Right echoes the behavior if not the ideas of the Fascist parties in the Parliaments of Italy and Germany in the 1920s and early 1930s, before they became outright dictatorships. Read more…
from Asad Zaman
Ideology and Science are diametrically opposed to each other. An ideology is a set of beliefs that is maintained even in face of strong empirical evidence to the contrary. Science is primarily concerned with explaining the empirical evidence. Theories which conflict with observations are rejected. This does not mean that ideology is necessarily wrong or bad – we must maintain our belief in justice, morality, honesty, trust, integrity without any empirical evidence; indeed, even when strong empirical evidence suggests that these beliefs will not bring us popularity or personal benefits. However, ideological beliefs in wrong ideas can blind us to the facts and prevent learning which is essential to progress. Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz remarked that modern Economics represents the triumph of ideology over science. This essay explains the reasons for his remarks.
Modern economic theory is founded on axioms for rational behavior, which is equated with selfish behavior by economists. No empirical evidence is presented for this axiom; rather it is taken to be self-evident. In the 1980’s some psychologists, perplexed by the economic theories of human behavior, decided to test these theories via some experiments. Amazingly, nearly all experiments conducted showed human behavior to be strongly in conflict with the economic axioms. A widely replicated experiment is called “The Prisoner’s Dilemma”. This game is similar to many real life situations, where an individual can benefit by betraying a social agreement, as long as other parties stick to the agreement. However, if all people betray the agreement, then everybody loses. Economic theory predicts that selfish individuals will betray agreements, and social conventions of cooperation will break down. However, real life experiments show that cooperation and maintenance of social conventions, even with complete strangers, is quite common. Generally, economic theory assumes that selfish motives dominate all others. However, real life behavior in experiments displays a large variety of motivations, based on reciprocity, trust, generosity, charity, morality, and other motives which are assumed absent in economic theories. read more
from Maria Alejandra Madi
In the post-war boom era of 1945 to 1971, the U.S. surplus was at the center of the global economic order. Throughout the Bretton Woods period, the United States recycled part of its surplus via foreign direct investment – mainly in Western Europe and also in Japan. Within the system of international economic flows, the U.S. exported goods to the rest of the world and also finance these purchases. Besides, the United States created demand for the exports of foreign countries, primarily Germany and Japan.
After the 1970s, this system of international economic flows changed. From 1971 to 2008, there is the expansion of the age of high finance where the U.S. deficits have been at the center of the global economic order. Considering this background, What Yanis Varoufakis (2013) calls the “Global Minotaur” is the system of international economic flows built after the 1970s. According to this system, the whole world surpluses aimed to finance the unsustainable expansion of a double deficit on which the US built its political and economic hegemony. The American trade surplus turned into a large and increasing deficit that joined the government deficit to form the twin deficits. These twin deficits characterize the “Global Minotaur era”. read more
“The two necessary words to describe the dominant economic “regime” of the past 35 years” – William R. Neil
It’s hard not to notice, during the American Presidential election drama, that despite all the debates and speeches, and multiple candidates, the terms “Neoliberalism” and “austerity” have yet to be employed, much less explained, these being the two necessary words to describe the dominant economic “regime” of the past 35 years. And this despite the fact that most observers recognize that a “populist revolt” driven by economic unhappiness is underway via the campaigns of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders. With Trump, of course, we are getting much more, the uglier side of American populism: racism, xenophobia and misogyny, at least; the culture wars at a higher pitch.
Yet when Trump commented on the violence which canceled his Chicago rally on the evening of March 11th, he stated that the underlying driver of his supporters’ anger is economic distress, not the ugly cultural prejudices. The diagnoses for the root cause of this anger thus lie at the heart of the proposed solutions. For students of the Great Depression, this will sound very familiar. That is because, despite many diversions and sub-currents, we are really arguing about a renewed New Deal versus an ever more purified laissez-faire, the nineteenth century term for keeping government out of markets – once those markets had been constructed. “Interventions”, however, as we will see, are still required, because no one, left or right, can live with the brutalities of the workings of “free markets” except as they exist in the fantasyland of the American Right. Read more…
from Dean Baker
Paul Krugman actually did not make any predictions on the stock market, so those looking to get investment advice from everyone’s favorite Nobel Prize winning economist will be disappointed. But he did make some interesting comments on the market’s new high. Some of these are on the mark, but some could use some further elaboration.
I’ll start with what is right. First, Krugman points out that the market is horrible as a predictor of the future of the economy. The market was also at a record high in the fall of 2007. This was more than a full year after the housing bubble’s peak. At the time, house prices were falling at a rate of more than 1 percent a month, eliminating more than $200 billion of homeowner’s equity every month. Somehow the wizards of Wall Street did not realize this would cause problems for the economy. The idea that the Wall Street gang has some unique insight into the economy is more than a bit far-fetched.
The second point where Krugman is right on the money (yes, pun intended) is that the market is supposed to be giving us the value of future profits, not an assessment of the economy. This is the story if we think of the stock market acting in textbook form where all investors have perfect foresight. The news that the economy will boom over the next decade, but the profit share will plummet as workers get huge pay increases, would be expected to give us a plunging stock market. Conversely, weak growth coupled with a rising profit share should mean a rising market. Even in principle the stock market is not telling us about the future of the economy, it is telling us about the future of corporate profits.
Okay, now for a few points where Krugman’s comments could use a bit deeper analysis. Read more…
from Michael Hudson
Review of William Goetzmann, Money Changes Everything:
How Finance Made Civilization Possible (Princeton University Press, 2016)
Debt mounts up faster than the means to pay. Yet there is widespread lack of awareness regarding what this debt dynamic implies. From Mesopotamia in the third millennium BC to the modern world, the way in which society has dealt with the buildup of debt has been the main force transforming political relations.
Financial textbook writers tell happy-face fables that depict loans only as being productive and helping debtors, not as threatening social stability. Government intervention to promote economic growth and solvency by writing down debts and protecting debtors at creditors’ expense is accused of causing an economic crisis (defined as bankers and bondholders not making as much money as they thought they would). Creditor lobbyists are not eager to save indebted consumers, businesses and governments from bankruptcy and foreclosure. The result is a biased body of analysis, which some extremists project back throughout history.
The most recent such travesty is William Goetzmann’s Money Changes Everything, widely praised in the financial press for its celebration of finance through the ages. A Professor of Finance and Management at the Yale School of Management, he credits “monetization of the Athenian economy” – the takeoff of debt – as playing “a central role in the transition to … democracy” (p. 17), and assures his readers that finance is inherently democratic, not oligarchic: “The golden age of Athens owes as much to financial litigation as it does to Socrates” (p. 1). That litigation consisted mainly of creditors foreclosing on the property of debtors. Read more…
from Thomas Palley
In economic policy, timing isn’t everything, it’s the only thing. The euro zone crisis has been
evolving for over seven years, making it difficult to time policy proposals. Now, the shock of
Brexit has created a definitive political opportunity for reforming rather than patching the euro.
With that in mind, I would like to revive an earlier mistimed proposal for a euro zone “financing
union” (English version, German version). The proposal contrasts with others that emphasize
“spending unions”. But first some preliminaries.
The euro zone’s original sin
The original sin within the euro zone is the separation of money from the state via the creation of
the European Central Bank (ECB) which displaced national central banks. Under the euro,
countries no longer have their own currency for which they can set their own exchange rate and
interest rate, and nor can they call on a national central bank to buy government bonds and
finance government spending. Read more…
from David Ruccio
This is my own chart—showing the dramatic changes in the average incomes of the bottom 90 percent, the top 10 percent, and the top 1 percent—from the World Wealth and Income Database.
Incomes are in thousands of real 2015 dollars. Thus, for example, the average income of the bottom 90 percent fell between 1979 and 2015 (from $34.6 thousand to $33.2 thousand), while the average income of the top 10 percent rose (from $149.1 thousand to $273.8 thousand) and that of the top 1 percent soared (from $370.2 thousand to over $1 million).
Emmanuel Saez, Thomas Piketty, and the rest of the team need to be credited for making their data available. Readers should feel free to use this chart and reproduce it as they wish. . .
Exhibit 1. Economic growth became norm only after industrial revolution
Looking further back in history, however, we can see that economic stagnation due to a lack of borrowers was much closer to the norm for thousands of years before the industrial revolution in the 1760s. As shown in Exhibit 1, economic growth had been negligible for centuries before that. There were probably many who tried to save during this period of essentially zero growth, because human beings have always been worried about an uncertain future. Preparing for old age and the proverbial rainy day is an ingrained aspect of human nature. But if it is only human to save, the centuries-long economic stagnation prior to the industrial revolution must have been due to a lack of borrowers.
For the private sector to be borrowing money, it must have a clean balance sheet and promising investment opportunities. After all, private-sector businesses will not borrow unless they are sure they can pay back the debt with interest. But with little or no technological innovation before the industrial revolution, which was essentially a technological revolution, there were few investment projects capable of paying for themselves. Businesses also tend to minimize debt when they see no investment opportunities because the probability of facing bankruptcy is reduced drastically if the firm carries no debt. Given the dearth of investment opportunities prior to the industrial revolution, it is easy to understand why there were so few willing borrowers. Read more…
from Lars Syll
In his review of Mervyn King’s The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking, and the Future of the Global Economy Krugman writes:
Is this argument right, analytically? I’d like to see King lay out a specific model for his claims, because I suspect that this is exactly the kind of situation in which words alone can create an illusion of logical coherence that dissipates when you try to do the math. Also, it’s unclear what this has to do with radical uncertainty. But this is a topic that really should be hashed out in technical working papers.
This passage really says it all.
Despite all his radical rhetoric, Krugman is — where it really counts — nothing but a die-hard neoclassical economist. Just as people like Milton Friedman, Robert Lucas or Greg Mankiw.
The only economic analysis that Krugman and other mainstream economists accept is the one that takes place within the analytic-formalistic modeling strategy that makes up the core of mainstream economics. All models and theories that do not live up to the precepts of the mainstream methodological canon are pruned. You’re free to take your models — not using (mathematical) models at all is, as made clear by Krugman’s comment on King, totally unthinkable — and apply them to whatever you want – as long as you do it within the mainstream approach and its modeling strategy. If you do not follow this particular mathematical-deductive analytical formalism you’re not even considered doing economics. ‘If it isn’t modeled, it isn’t economics.’ Read more…
from David Ruccio
from Thomas Palley
Voters of all stripes have recognized the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as another betrayal of working people, and they have resoundingly rejected it. Despite that, President Obama continues to push it, to the extent of possibly seeking passage in a “lame duck” session of Congress.
President Obama’s pushing of the TPP is recklessly irresponsible politics that benefits Donald Trump who is the outsider candidate. Hillary Clinton is the insider who has touted her links to President Obama, and she still lacks credibility regarding her TPP opposition because of her past endorsement.
In the current dangerous political climate there is no room for error. Yet, that is what we have. Clinton has refused to condemn the TPP in the Democratic Party platform, setting herself up for Trump. Not only does she risk handing the issue to Trump, giving him the economic high-ground, she also sets herself up as “crooked Hillary”. She was for the TPP, then she was against it, and now she is for it again? That plays into voters’ worst assessment of her character.
As for President Obama, he must be made to realize that every time he pushes the TPP, he might as well be campaigning for Donald Trump. Read more…
from Asad Zaman
This post was meant to provide a framework for further elaboration of the idea of ET1% — the Economic Theory of the top 1% — as one ingredient of a Meta-Theory of Economics. However, covering necessary preliminary background already took up more than a thousand words, so this project has been deferred for a later post. The goal of this post is to explain why we need to focus on Meta-Theoretical aspects of social science, rather than whether or not economic theories are true or false. The perspective emerges from my understanding of the Methodology of Polanyi’s “The Great Transformation” [which was recently ranked as the 2nd most important book of the 20th Century in a Poll of RWER Blog Readers]
As the name indicates a Meta-Theory for Economics is a theory about economic theories. As we are all aware, economic theories evolve, change and mutate. Multiple rival conflicting and contradictory theories co-exist within the mainstream. Outside the mainstream, there are people (like myself) who claim that all of mainstream theories are fundamentally and deeply flawed.
A meta-theory studies the process by which new theories emerge. Some of the central questions for a meta-theory would be: Read more…
Does, contrary to the assumptions of many economic models, ‘involuntary unemployment’ exist? Of course. We measure it (for the definition see below). And in the USA it is going down. About two months ago I posted this graph, which showed that what I call involuntary unemployment in the USA tended upwards. Two months of additional data show that this was, fortunately, just a hiccup – though the decline is not as fast as it used to be. Some musings about models and measurement, starting with a somewhat exasperated Josh Mason: “Economics the discipline is to the economy the sphere of social reality as chess theory is to medieval history: The statement, say, that “queens are most effective when supported by strong bishops” might be reasonable in both domains, but studying its application in the one case will not help at all in applying it in the other.” . And I agree with the next remark: ” One consequence of this is, as I say, that radical criticism of the realism or logical consistency of orthodox economics do nothing to get us closer to a positive understanding of the economy.”. Pointing out that the ‘periodic system’ of economic theory is packed with inconsistencies and unobservables is not enough. We need a fundamentally better system. One way to do this is to look outside the circle of academic economists to the people who measure (macro-)economic variables, the economic statisticians. As it happens, the journal of the USA Bureau of Labour Statistics, the Monthly Labour Review, was established one hundred years ago (it is no coincidence that the battle of the Somme was one hundred years ago, too). Aside: the Review is online and, as the BLS is a government agency, not gated – a fine example of path dependent productivity and mood boosting technology). Read more…
from Lars Syll
Most self-described Keynesians are Part 1ers. They don’t necessarily believe that workers and consumers are perfectly rational, or deny that sudden shifts in behavior can happen, but irrationality and volatility are at the fringes of their worldview.
King argues, however, that this is all wrong; he is, basically, a Chapter 12er, asserting that economic decisions always take place under conditions of “radical uncertainty”—ignorance about the future that can’t be quantified by probabilities, so that there is no such thing as optimizing behavior. People cope with this uncertainty by settling on “narratives” that are conventionally accepted at any given moment, but can suddenly change. And he urges economists to turn away from supply-and-demand-type analysis, which he calls the economics of “stuff”—as in markets for prosaic physical goods—in favor of the economics of “stuff happens.”
That’s not an unheard-of position, but it’s a remarkable one for an ex–central banker to take, let alone one who, in a former life, was a card-carrying mainstream economist. Why does he go there? Read more…
- The UK environmental accounts.
“Energy consumption from renewable and waste sources has been increasing since 1990; reaching a record high of 14.4 million tonnes of oil equivalent in 2014. These sources contributed 7.1% of total energy consumption.Emissions of greenhouse gases have decreased since 1990; peaking in 1991 at 845.2 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent and falling to 608.6 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2014. This is the lowest level since 1990. The amount of material resources consumed (per person) has decreased by 30.4% between 2000 and 2014, falling from 12.5 tonnes per person to 8.7 tonnes per person.The trend of road transport fuel switching from petrol to diesel continued. Between 2013 and 2014, diesel use increased by 3.3%, whereas petrol use decreased by 2.0%. Since 1997, UK government spend on environmental protection expenditure (EPE) has increased from £4.1 billion to £15.4 billion in 2014, and currently accounts for 1.9% of total government spending. Read more…
from Lars Syll
Many mainstream macroeconomists hold on to the hope that they will not be doomed forever to always ‘fight the last war,’ but instead, building on timeless microfoundational rules — Lucas ‘deep parameters’ — they will be able to predict upcoming problems before they happen. Adding some new little twist to the DSGE model will make all the difference …
What these economists ‘forget,’ however, is that to produce these n:th variations of the basic DSGE model, they still have to make ridiculously simplifying assumptions to make the models ‘forecast’ anything.
This is nothing but the age-old machine dream of neoclassical economics — an epistemologically founded cyborg dream that disregards the fundamental ontological fact that economies and societies are open — not closed — systems.
The empirical and theoretical evidence is clear. Predictions and forecasts are inherently difficult to make in a socio-economic domain where genuine uncertainty and unknown unknowns often rule the roost. The real processes that underly the time series that economists use to make their predictions and forecasts do not confirm with the assumptions made in the applied statistical and econometric models. Much less is a fortiori predictable than standardly — and uncritically — assumed. The forecasting models fail to a large extent because the kind of uncertainty that faces humans and societies actually makes the models strictly seen inapplicable. The future is inherently unknowable — and using statistics, econometrics, decision theory or game theory, does not in the least overcome this ontological fact. The economic future is not something that we normally can predict in advance. Better then to accept that as a rule “we simply do not know.” Read more…