Home > Uncategorized > Plan for stopping the climate catastrophe – Is it magic realism or a serious possibility?

Plan for stopping the climate catastrophe – Is it magic realism or a serious possibility?

from Jorge Buzaglo

Is it fake science? Is it magic realism? Or is it the launch of a serious, rational, open debate beyond establishment politicians, diplomats, and other amateurs? The following is (the internet translation of) an article published in the main Swedish morning newspaper by Mats Persson, economics professor and member of the Royal Academy of Sciences. According to him, it does not have to be painful and difficult to stop the climate catastrophe; on the contrary, it can be quite simple. In any case, my own choice is developed in http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue44/Buzaglo44.pdf, or in a more detailed form by a number of reputed scientists including the late “economics Nobel prize” winner Elinor Ostrom (https://science.sciencemag.org/content/319/5864/724.2).

Let the UN climate conference introduce global carbon dioxide taxes

 

Do something!” Says Greta Thunberg. Her call raises three questions that must be answered: What should we do? Who will do it? And how should the measures be designed so that they become politically acceptable — even for populists and climate deniers?

With regard to the first question, we must reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and in particular carbon dioxide. All economists agree that this can be achieved through a global tax on carbon dioxide emissions of between $ 100 and $ 200 per metric ton. This will give consumers an incentive to demand climate-smart goods and services, and companies will be given incentives to meet this demand. Certainly, it is good if the automotive and aerospace industries are voluntarily trying to develop fuel-efficient engines — but there is nothing that speeds up the technological development such as sharp financial incentives.

The second issue is more complicated. Already today, several countries have introduced a carbon dioxide tax, including Sweden. But now we have to gather around a global tax that must be placed on top of existing taxes. Who will accomplish this?

Here in Europe, we probably think in the first place of the EU. But, unfortunately, the EU does not work in this case, for two reasons. First, the EU is far too small; it accounts for only 10 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions. Secondly, not many people want to give the EU its own taxation rights.

Instead, the solution is in the form of the UN’s annual climate conferences. These, which have been organized in a number of cities (for example, Copenhagen, Paris, and most recently Katowice in Poland) cover virtually all the countries of the world and have been disappointing every year. They have issued beautiful declarations, but no obligatory compromises — and then nothing has happened. The latest meeting is a clear example; in Katowice, the idea was to give concrete form to the promises from the Paris meeting in 2015. But of that, nothing became, and the delegates went home disappointed again (except the delegates from the coal and oil producing countries, who were probably satisfied with the non-result). The reason for the impotence of UN conferences is simple: their agendas are poorly designed. They are supposed to agree on quantitative cuts in carbon dioxide emissions, of the form “Land A will reduce its emissions by x percent (or y tons) in the next few years, and country B will reduce its emissions by z percent”. But no country likes quantitative cuts. Each country therefore usually puts forward several arguments against why “our country” should cut down so much: “We are so poor” or “We have already cut so much down so much” or “Our government will lose power to a populist opposition.”

Therefore, climate conferences have not produced any results. We must now redo their agendas. Instead of general promises of quantitative cuts, conferences should gather countries around a carbon tax. Such a tax does not mean that the UN gets own taxation rights; the tax is to be administered by each individual country, and the individual governments thus get control of the tax revenue themselves.

In fact, this is one of the features of a carbon tax that can make it politically feasible. The UN conferences will thereby be transformed from an impotent discussion club into a forum for sharp decisions — decisions that lie in the interests of each individual country. Presumably, the oil-producing countries will vote against a carbon tax — but it does nothing because the oil producers are still quite few, and all oil-consuming countries actually have incentives to introduce the tax. We come here to the third question of those mentioned at the outset: How should the necessary action be designed to be politically acceptable to governments that must take into account (or themselves consist of) populists and climate deniers? Assume that an individual country introduces a tax of $ 100 per ton of carbon dioxide. This corresponds to approximately 2.50 SEK per liter of gasoline. Then the petrol price would rise by 2.50 SEK and attract protesting “yellow vests” on the streets.

But if, instead, all countries introduce a carbon tax, it will be different. Then the world market price of oil will fall. Exactly how much it falls depends on the long-term price sensitivity of supply and demand. For the sake of simplicity, suppose the world market price falls by half the tax amount, i.e. by SEK 1.25. The price increase for consumers is therefore only half of the tax: SEK 1.25. At the same time, the state gets SEK 2.50 per liter. How does that work?

The answer is that consumers account for half of the increase in the state’s tax revenue, while oil producers are forced to account for the other half in the form of a lower world market price. If we assume that an average person buys 1000 liters of gas per year, the state receives an average of SEK 2,500 per person on average. However, as the price for the consumer only increases by SEK 1.25, the annual additional cost for consumers is “only” SEK 1,250, if consumption is unchanged. (Corresponding calculations can easily be made with regard to the fact that the price increase after some time gets demanded quantity to decrease, and for other fossil fuels, for example coal).

What should the state do with these new incomes? This is where you can see that a global carbon dioxide tax is politically feasible.

One answer is that the state simply pays the money back in the form of a lump sum of SEK 2,500 per capita. The cost of the tax is thus SEK 1,250 on average, but the income is 2,500. It sounds almost too good to be true. And will the effect not be completely thwarted then, if the consumers get back the money by the way?

No not at all. The tax raises the relative price of gasoline for consumers, which attracts fuel savings and increased demand for more fuel-efficient vehicles. And this also applies if consumers receive a large income supplement in the form of a lump sum of SEK 2,500. If the state thus uses the increased tax revenue to compensate consumers, we still get a climate gain.

Then, of course, the state does not have to pay the money back. Some countries might rather use them to alleviate the budget deficit, or invest them in education and welfare. A third country might use the money for increasing military expenditures, a fourth to build a wall against Mexico. The examples show how a tax can be even more appealing than if it was only paid back to consumers as a lump sum. And that applies regardless of whether the countries in question are democracies or dictatorships, and whether they are governed by climate-conscious politicians or by climate denialists. The financial incentives are simply so strong that virtually all governments could be attracted.

It does not have to be painful and difficult to stop the climate catastrophe. On the contrary, it can be quite simple. But then a carbon dioxide tax must be put as the first issue of the agenda for UN climate conferences.

Dagens Nyheter, June 23, 2019.

  1. June 26, 2019 at 5:18 pm

    We have a carbon tax of $50 a tonne in Canada, and it is being imposed with 90% of the revenue being returned to citizens. Yet in Ontario, under a right-wing government, the provincial government is spending $30 million to fight the tax in court, and whipping up hostility and hatred against the tax. The concept makes total economic sense, but politically, the concept of global taxation would be like a red rag to a right wing bull, making it really difficult ever to get agreement on.

  2. June 26, 2019 at 7:58 pm

    I posted the hockey stick graph of CO2 with Y axis starting zero to 35k ppm and x axis the current era, o to 2020. Will there be time for this excellent tax?

    http://www.constituentassembly.org

  3. Ken Zimmerman
    June 28, 2019 at 8:49 pm

    In other comments on this blog I summarized parts of the book by anthropologist/archeologist Brian Fagan; “The Great Warming: Climate Change and the Rise and Fall of Civilizations.” The book is a study of the civilizational impacts of five centuries of changing climate—in fact, of a global warming—between 800 and 1300 CE, and of the changes’ impact on the world of a millennium ago. As in our own time, climate change did not plot a straight line from year to year and varied from place to place. But its peaks and valleys followed a trend that we can clearly make out in retrospect. We have much to learn from this story about the power of climate change to affect our own future. This period is called “The Medieval Warm Period.” The Medieval Warm Period gave way to six centuries of highly unsettled climate and cooler conditions: the Little Ice Age (1300 to 1900).

    in most places warming was reflected in milder winters and longer summers, but the temperature differences were never more than a few degrees. And many places were not warmer. In the eastern Pacific, the same centuries were cool and dry. These were times of sudden, unpredictable climatic swings, and, above all, of drought. Extended medieval dry cycles helped topple the Anasazi and Maya civilizations, and starved tens of thousands of northern Chinese farmers. In Europe the construction of the cathedral of Notre Dame de Chartres demonstrated the power of climate change to raise up civilization. Chartres was built at a time when Europe basked in a warmer climate and enjoyed a long series of good harvests.

    A thousand years ago most humans still lived in small hunting bands or as subsistence farmers, surviving from harvest to harvest, eking out a living from the soil. Much of the aridity that helped extinguish the Anasazi and Maya civilizations can be traced to persistent La Niña conditions in the Pacific, especially around 1100 to 1200. But climate change is never a direct or complete determinant. The effects of climate changes are generally more indirect and subtle, like ripples from a rock thrown into a mountain lake. It is not so much the immediate impact of a major shift like drought, a flood cycle, or an El Niño that causes political or social change. Rather, the subtle consequences rippling through society make the difference: new strategies for storing water; the planting of more drought-resistant cereals; the development of new institutions such as secret societies that collect information for predicting rainfall. Therefore, climate change is not just about climate science. But also, about how human societies cope with and adapt to climate change.

    Thus, the proposals of Mats Persson are both reasonable and workable. But considering the features of climate change we know about empirically; I suggest several additions to Persson’s proposals I believe are essential. First, since climate change is nonlinear in terms of periods and geography, international agreements must we worked out in advance spelling out how tax money is to be transferred from less effected locations and periods to locations and periods more heavily impacted. Second, since climate change impacts are difficult to predict specifically in advance, a contingency fund must be created to deal with unexpected impacts by location and time period. Third, when funds to deal with climate change impacts run short, as they likely will at times, a detailed and quickly implementable process must exist to increase CO2 and other climate change taxes within 30-60 days to make up any short fall. Finally, climate change processes now underway are different in at least one respect than those of the Medieval Warm Period and Little Ice Age. The warming now underway is mitigated partially by the cooling that continues from the Little Ice Age. Otherwise, global temperatures would be even higher currently. As this cooling declines the effects of the warming may become stronger. We should be ready to deal with the effects of any such variations.

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