Home > Uncategorized > The problem with economics — too much maths, too little history

The problem with economics — too much maths, too little history

from Lars Syll

Mainstream economists have always wanted to use their hammer, and so have decided to pretend that the world looks like a nail. Pretending that uncertainty can be reduced to risk and that all activities, relations, processes, and events can be adequately converted to pure numbers, have only contributed to making economics irrelevant and powerless when confronting real-world financial crises and economic havoc.

How do we put an end to this intellectual cataclysm? How do we re-establish credence and trust in economics as a science? Five changes are absolutely decisive.

(1) Stop pretending that we have exact and rigorous answers to everything. Because we don’t. We build models and theories and tell people that we can calculate and foresee the future. But we do this based on mathematical and statistical assumptions that often have little or nothing to do with reality. By pretending that there is no really important difference between model and reality we lull people into thinking that we have things under control. We haven’t! This false feeling of security was one of the factors that contributed to the financial crisis of 2008.

(2) Stop the childish and exaggerated belief in mathematics giving answers to important economic questions. Mathematics gives exact answers to exact questions. But the relevant and interesting questions we face in the economic realm are rarely of that kind. Questions like “Is 2 + 2 = 4?” are never posed in real economies. Instead of a fundamentally misplaced reliance on abstract mathematical-deductive-axiomatic models having anything of substance to contribute to our knowledge of real economies, it would be far better if we pursued “thicker” models and relevant empirical studies and observations.

(3) Stop pretending that there are laws in economics. There are no universal laws in economics. Economies are not like planetary systems or physics labs. The most we can aspire to in real economies is establishing possible tendencies with varying degrees of generalizability.

(4) Stop treating other social sciences as poor relations. Economics has long suffered from hubris. A more broad-minded and multifarious science would enrich today’s altogether quixotic economics.

(5) Stop building models and making forecasts of the future based on totally unreal micro-founded macro models with intertemporally optimizing robot-like representative actors equipped with rational expectations. This is pure nonsense. We have to build our models on assumptions that are not so blatantly in contradiction to reality. Assuming that people are green and come from Mars is not good – not even as a ‘successive approximation’ – modelling strategy.

Mainstream economic theory today is still in the story-telling business whereby economic theorists create mathematical make-believe analogue models of the target system – usually conceived as the real economic system. This mathematical modelling activity is considered useful and essential. To understand and explain relations between different entities in the real economy the predominant strategy is to build mathematical models and make things happen in these ‘analog-economy models’ rather than engineering things happening in real economies.

Without strong evidence, all kinds of absurd claims and nonsense may pretend to be science. Let us not forget what Paul Romer said  in his attack on ‘post-real’ economics some years ago:

Math cannot establish the truth value of a fact. Never has. Never will.

We have to demand more of a justification than rather watered-down versions of ‘anything goes’ when it comes to the main postulates on which mainstream economics is founded. If one proposes ‘efficient markets’ or ‘rational expectations’ one also has to support their underlying assumptions. As a rule, none is given, which makes it rather puzzling how things like ‘efficient markets’ and ‘rational expectations’ have become standard modelling assumptions made in much of modern macroeconomics. The reason for this sad state of ‘modern’ economics is that economists often mistake mathematical beauty for truth.

  1. pfeffertag
    February 28, 2024 at 1:35 am

    “Stop pretending that we have exact and rigorous answers to everything.”

    Beat-up. No economist thinks economics is exact.

    “Stop treating other social sciences as poor relations.”

    Economics doesn’t take any notice of the other social sciences.

    Economics can claim some laws. The other social sciences are can’t even claim. Economics is premised on people acting in their self-interest. Psychology has not yet found out about this.

    Economics tries to follow standard scientific procedure: make a hypothesis—a relationship between two or more concepts—then draw the logical consequences and look at reality for those consequences. The other social sciences try to test first by seeking linear correlations between presumed (subjective) categories. This has failed to deliver for over a century.

    Economics is useful, however imperfect. The other social sciences are not.

  2. energyasnumeraire
    February 28, 2024 at 7:48 am

    I would add a zeroth topic:

    (0) Start accepting that economics are using (today) a rubber band of unit meter to measure dimensions from a bubble within that bubble without a defined real world characteristic instead of – at least – asking or start searching for a (at least theoretical) real world stable physical characteristic of economic systems.

    Measuring a bubble (economic system with no defined border between the economic system and nature) with a rubber band of relativenes (money as a tool of relative value measuring) is not a way of discussing real world growth.

    That is a discussion where I would like to add the fact, that any (!) process, system, delivery, thought, … in whatever scale … has a given real world stable physical characteristic. Check thermodynamic laws.

    What really is missing is an economic theory based or embedded into physical reality.

    As long as economists measure the total size of economic systems without having a stable unit in real world terms, as long using the relative dimension unit money, the discussion is a discussion of rubber band inside measurement results talking about the size of the bubble they live in.

    Its not totally wothless – but totally free of understanding real world dimension characteristics.

    Economic theories cover not more of 50% of the real economic systems.
    The missing 50% are physics as the base for embedding any economic system into the world we live in.

  3. Giles Conway-Gordon
    March 1, 2024 at 1:55 am

    Lars Syll’s aversion to the excessive use of mathematics in Economics is fully justified. It enables vacuous abstraction to masquerade as useful scientific analysis. I recommend he reads my recent book Shamanomics (see http://www.shamanomics.info for a summary). Chapter 6, ‘Was Keynes a Muggle?’, addresses the problem. (Greg Mankiw regards non- mathematical economists as Muggles.)

    Sent from my Verizon, Samsung Galaxy smartphone Get Outlook for Androidhttps://aka.ms/ghei36 ________________________________

  4. March 1, 2024 at 4:06 pm

    Lars Syll is absolutely correct. The excessive use of mathematics in Economics allows economists to pretend that their vacuous abstractions are useful, scientific analysis. I suggest Prof Syll reads my book Shamanomics (see http://www.shamanomics.info for a summary) particularly Chapter 6, ‘Was Keynes a Muggle?’. (Greg Mankiw regards any economist who isn’t steeped in the use of mathematics as a Muggle.)

    Giles Conway-Gordon

    http://www.gilescogo.com

  5. ghholtham
    March 2, 2024 at 2:09 am

    Contrary to pfeffertag’s assertion, psychology has made much more progress in recent decades than macroeconomics. It has had the advantage of being able to link to its biological substratum, the human brain. By combining empirical work in psychology and neuroscience much has been discovered.  Computer science and AI, have also made much greater progress than macroeconomics, where forecasting has not improved in 50 years. Progress was not made by avoiding mathematical modelling but by accepting, not ignoring, the verdict of data and empirical tests – being guided by what works not by preconceived notions or arbitrary axioms. 

    H.A. Simon is now regarded as one of the great pioneers in AI and he made seminal contributions to psychology. He got the economics Nobel in the 1970s and if economics had followed his lead – embrace uncertainty and complexity, understand that procedural rationality in the presence of uncertainty is nothing like “rational expectation”, a fancy term for impossible omniscience – we would be much further ahead. Lars is entirely correct about imaginary worlds, whose properties are chosen for ideological reasons not for any relation to reality. The approach should have been to study what people do, how they deal with uncertainty and build those findings into necessarily complex models, with no insistence on an “equilibrium” but looking to reproduce only such homeostatic properties as real economies display.

    Simon was ecumenical and believed in inter-disciplinary working. Pfeffertag’s contempt for other social studies is typical among economists and contributes to their sterility. Yes, economics has theories, hardly laws, but they are not scientific; they are Aesopean fables, relating to imaginary worlds, and designed to produce the ideological conclusions favoured by their authors. Robert Lucas, not Simon, has been the most influential economist of the late 20th century and he didn’t even pretend he had any other function than telling fables with the right moral. Read his article in the Journal of Applies Economics in May 2011.

    • March 3, 2024 at 11:14 am

      “The approach should have been to study what people do, how they deal with uncertainty and build those findings into necessarily complex models, with no insistence on an “equilibrium” but looking to reproduce only such homeostatic properties as real economies display.”

      Homeostatic progress is how a complex system tries to reach a more balanced state of equilibrium, even though it probably never gets there. This process can be expressed in logical, scientific terms using algebraic variables and through the introduction of time-based dynamics. So what ghholtham has written is correct and what we now need is a properly expressed and logical way for describing how this may be simulated.

      In my book, I have discovered how this analysis can be expressed in simple mathematical terms, and using certain sensible assumptions have illustrated this method when applied to various kinds of taxation. The result shows that when compared to an increase in income tax, an equal amount of tax taken from land values (as if it were ground-rent) would be about 3 times more beneficial to the whole macroeconomy, taken at large.

      I will gladly share (for free) this scientific explanation “Consequential Macroeconomics–Rationalizing About How Our Social System Works”, should you send me a request for this 310-page work. chestdher@gmail.com

    • yoshinorishiozawa
      March 8, 2024 at 9:09 am

      I also adore Herbert A. Simon. When he received Nobel Prize in 1978, I thought it was a story similar to other laureates who were chosen to give authority to the newly created Prize in Economic Sciences as a representative of already established fields. However, when I read some of Simon’s papers and books, I was fascinated by his deep ideas. He is not a simple traditional psychologist but a founder of organization theory, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Simon’s contributions to economics are great, but few economists noticed the importance of his ideas.

      If an economic agents (people and firms) are an entity who behaves with bounded rationality, we should find how they behave in a real economy. Utility maximization is impossible. Firms aims to increase their profit, but profit maximization is impossible if it means that firms choose quantities given prices. So the fundamental assumptions of neoclassical economics are easily rejected by experience and by theoretical reasonings. Lars Syll’s favorite campaign against mathematics is totally unneeded and misleading. On the contrary, mathematics is useful to point out that utility maximization is practically impossible, because the theory of computing complexity (a part of mathematics) tells us that the world is full of intractable problems (or problems whose computing time increases rapidly at a power order), especially when we try to maximize something.

      Lars Syll’s campaign is not only useless but positively toxic, because it keep young hopeful students away from economics, making them think that economics is not a challenging field of sciences.

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