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Flassbeck vs. Krugman on hot money

Below is an excerpt from a theRealNews.com interview today with Heiner Flassbeck

JAY: Now, we’ve talked a bit about this before, and I know this issue of exchange rates is quite complicated. There’s many factors involved. But one of the main factors, it seems to me, if I’m understanding it correctly, is interest rates are so low in the United States because the Fed is making sure they stay as low as possible, but to a large extent because there’s so little real demand in the United States, wages are so stagnant and so low, that they’re doing everything they can to kind of keep, you know, as much as they can, boosting the economy with cheap credit. And then this has global consequences, not just American domestic consequences. Do I have it right?

FLASSBECK: Yeah, that’s one thing, that’s one factor that’s very important. But, as I said before, it’s not only the U.S. We have zero interest rates in Japan. When the U.S. still had higher interest rate, the hedge funds went through Japan, borrowed money in Japan, and carried it to Brazil and other countries. So it’s always–there’s always a low interest rate country. Or it was done through Switzerland. So it’s not important how it is done.

But the crucial thing in here–I fully disagree with Paul Krugman. Paul Krugman said, you had capital controls in the ’50s and the ’60s under the Bretton Woods system. That’s true, but that’s not the whole truth. The much more important thing is that we didn’t have flexible exchange rates. We have flexible exchange rates, and these flexible exchange rates, with these huge flows of money, of hot money, are going in the wrong direction, they’re going definitely the wrong direction, because countries with a rather high inflation rate, like Turkey or Brazil, get an appreciation of their currencies, and everybody knows that’s absolutely untenable. Every good economic textbook will tell you that the country with the high inflation needs a depreciation. But the flexible exchange rate, the markets, the markets are doing exactly the wrong thing. And Krugman also is shying away from saying this very clearly. And this is the problem.

We had attempts in 2011 in the G20 to talk about a new monetary system, but everybody is shying away from touching this hot issue. This is the hot issue. The markets get the prices wrong. And this has to be addressed head-on. And that means you need intervention, international intervention into the market to avoid the misalignment in the first round, the misalignment driven by the market.

JAY: But the pegged exchange rates don’t seem to work either.

FLASSBECK: Well, you’re never prevented from inventing a smarter system than you had before, but you need a system. The system Bretton Woods didn’t work quite well, because it was a system that corrected the exchange rates when it was too late. I have proposed with someone other people in UNCTAD a system when you anticipate, so to say, the changes in the exchange rate that are needed and you do it right away, so that the big imbalances do not have time to build up. And this is a much smarter way to do it. And so why shouldn’t we learn?

But what is absolutely clear but is not mentioned by most economists, not even by a person like Paul Krugman, whom I like very much for many of his assertions, but he is not saying, well, flexible exchange rates do not work. But this is the fact and this is the core of the matter. And this–but if you say this, then it has harsh consequences for Wall Street, and nobody wants to tackle that.

  1. February 2, 2014 at 11:04 pm

    Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates and Currency Sovereignty

    http://ideas.repec.org/p/lev/wrkpap/wp_489.html

    Author Info

    C. Sardoni
    L. Randall Wray

    Abstract
    This paper provides an analysis of Keynes’s original “Bancor” proposal as well as more recent proposals for fixed exchange rates. We argue that these schemes fail to pay due attention to the importance of capital movements in today’s economy, and that they implicitly adopt an unsatisfactory notion of money as a mere medium of exchange. We develop an alternative approach to money based on the notion of currency sovereignty. As currency sovereignty implies the ability of a country to implement monetary and fiscal policies independently, we argue that it is necessarily contingent on a country’s adoption of floating exchange rates. As illustrations of the problems created for domestic policy by the adoption of fixed exchange rates, we briefly look at the recent Argentinean and European experiences. We take these as telling examples of the high costs of giving up sovereignty (Argentina and the European countries of the EMU) and the benefits of regaining it (Argentina). A regime of more flexible exchange rates would have likely produced a more viable and dynamic European economic system, one in which each individual country could have adopted and implemented a mix of fiscal and monetary policies more suitable to its specific economic, social, and political context. Alternatively, the euro area will have to create a fiscal authority on par with that of the U.S. Treasury, which means surrendering national authority to a central government–an unlikely possibility in today’s political climate. We conclude by pointing out some of the advantages of floating exchange rates, but also stress that such a regime should not be regarded as a sort of panacea. It is a necessary condition if a country is to retain its sovereignty and the power to implement autonomous economic policies, but it is not a sufficient condition for guaranteeing that such policies actually be aimed at providing higher levels of employment and welfare.

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