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Sapiential Economics

from Robert Locke

Neoclassical economists insist that the formal system of knowledge they create takes precedence over what we learn through experience, on the grounds, as Erich Schneider wrote, “that the sea of facts is dumb and can only be forced to reveal interconnections when properly queried.  Intelligent [sinnvoll] questions can only be derived from theoretical formal analysis.” (Bomback and Tacke, 37)  But what if it were the other way around that formal knowledge systems are dumb if they have no connection with the sea of facts, to experiential knowledge.

In Britain, the first modern industrial country, most skilled craftsmen behind the development of the productive force c. 1846 were not formally educated in science or engineering, but self-trained, or, rather, trained in apprenticeship or in a firm on the job.  Know-how was acquired primarily through tacit learning, intuitive and inarticulate, only through individual experience in the relevant context, where the knowing subject is involved, as opposed to explicit knowledge, codefiable, generated often through logical deduction, capable of being aggregated at a single location, stored in objective forms without the knowing subject being involved in the aggregation.  Legions of obscure engineers were trained this way.  Whitworth’s son noted that in his machine tool company,  

All our engineers have come up the ranks.  They entered here about age fourteen on the average.  They passed through all the workshops.  They learned all the techniques with their own hands.  As for their scientific instruction – nothing but what they could learn in night school.” (Quoted in Leclerc, 1917, 15)

Both the needed technical, as these citations indicate, and the commercial skills (bookkeeping) were learned privately tacitly on the job aided by short even school courses.  This did not matter because the training not only sufficed to produce a commercially and industrially dynamic Britain, but served as a source of Mental Capital internationally. It is the practical men we consult not the economists to get a handle on the state of Mental Capital in the age of the practical man.

At the beginning of the 20th century, people still thought that the best education occurred through tacit learning, intuitive and inarticulate.  The German Commission on Technical Instruction (DATCH) insisted (1912) on the importance of apprenticeship training. A Mr. James Patterson, before an assembly of accountants in 1911, put it this way:

I think and I think it is the experience of all who have carefully examined the cases that came under their notice, that a student who has been in a good office…makes a better accountant than a man who starts off with the halo of a University education.” (Nelson, 20)

This attitude persisted in UK accounting society’s right up though WWII.  Only in 1947 did eleven of the larger universities, by agreement with accountancy bodies, beginning accounting degree programs. (Locke, 1984, 139).  In 1950, the vast majority of accounting students in the British Isles prepared for their examinations while working as ‘articled’ clerks in an accountant’s office.

The shift from tacit to explicit education and training occurred in the United States post WWII.  Rakesh Khurana’s From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and thee Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession (PUP) describes the transformation of US business schools into centers of explicit education (see chapter, Disciplining the Business School Faculties, 233-90).  H. Thomas Johnson describes how this explicit knowledge shaped people working in business and industry:

“Successful [US] managers believed they could make decisions without knowing the company’s products, technologies, or customers. They had only to understand the intricacies of financial reporting … [B]y the 1970s managers came primarily from the ranks of accountants and controllers, rather than from the ranks of engineers, designers, and marketers. [This new managerial class] moved frequently among companies without regard to the industry or markets they served … A synergistic relationship developed between the management accounting taught in MBA programs and the practices emanating from corporate controllers’ offices, imparting to management accounting a life of its own and shaping the way managers ran businesses.” (Johnson and Bröms, 2000, 57)

He despised these lifeless pyramidal structures imposed on work processes and managed by computer-oriented production control experts:

“At first the abstract information compiled and transmitted by these computer systems merely supplemented the perspectives of managers who were already familiar with concrete details of the operations they managed, no matter how complicated and confused those operations became. Such individuals, prevalent in top management ranks before 1970, had a clear sense of the difference between “the map” created by abstract computer calculations and “the territory” that people inhabited in the workplace. Increasingly after 1970, however, managers lacking in shop floor experience or in engineering training, often trained in graduate business schools, came to dominate American and European manufacturing establishments. In their hands the “map was the territory.” In other words, they considered reality to be the abstract quantitative models, the management accounting reports, and the computer scheduling algorithms. (Johnson and Bröms, 2000, 23)

After studying the Toyota Production System, Johnson concluded that Management Accounting’s Control Systems that he had formerly praised, what he calls Management by Results, were responsible for the decline of U.S. manufacturing, especially automobiles. He recommended instituting Management by Means (the cultivation of inter-personal relationships on the shop floor). (See Johnson and Bröms (2000) and Rother, 2010). One could, Johnson claims, if work processes are properly organized, dispense with these U.S. management control mechanisms and get far better results.

With Johnson, the analysis of organizational management culture has comes full circle back to firm centered tacit on-the-job training like Whitworth’s machine tool firm had in the 19th century from top down formal financial control reporting systems, codified in business schools outside the firm.

Johnson’s  view has been explored by production engineers. Mike Rother and his team spent five years investigating the Toyota Kata (2004-2009), a system of “unseen management routines and thinking” through which the investigator has to find his way “along unpredictable paths through a systematic process of discovery and adjustments.” This became particularly challenging to this group of management consultants when they tried to teach Management by Means in Western firms whose executives have a command and control mindset. Rother ran into the difficulty especially when teaching Western managers about empowerments.  « A command and control approach] is insufficient for tapping the brainpower inside an organization in a purposeful way. If people in organizations are expected to make decisions and navigate rapidly at their level, rather than waiting to be told what to do, they need to be taught effective skills for how to do it” (Rother, 2014, 4).

To appreciate management by means requires the historian’s investigative methods not just those of a mathematically shaped scientific paradigm codified and taught in departments of economics and business schools. To teach the Toyota kata within firms where the mindset is formed by management by results-oriented codified and explicit systems of knowledge is extremely difficult.  Jeffrey K. Liker, points this out in “Building CI habits through practices: Lean is about a fundamental change in thinking.  How do we teach our brains to make the change;” he reaches back to William James’ 1890 essay “Habit,” to make the point: “A tendency to act only becomes effectively ingrained in us in proportion to the uninterrupted frequency with which the actions actually occur, and the brain ‘grows’ to their use.”

Liker is talking about how the teaching of Toyota production systems, the Toyota KATA, discussed generally under the rubric “lean production,” engages a different part of the brain from the usual classroom instruction:  “One thing that is clear is that changing mindsets is more about forging new neural pathways in practicing a new way, which in times replaces the old pathways, than just trying to erase old ways of thinking. .. This raises the bar about educating people to think lean… We cannot attach the subroutines etched in the hidden past of our brain with information and reasoning alone.”

These insights apply to the teaching of economics, which must engage parts of the brain that includes historical and cultural thinking of generated tacitly as well as explicit knowledge.  But brain research suggests that the same resistance that explicit knowledge presents to the teaching of the Toyota Kata in production facilities, occurs elsewhere, for, in the findings presented at Neuroscience 2013, the annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, one researcher reported that  “mindfulness (explicit knowledge) may help prevent formation of automatic habits — which is done through implicit learning.”

The history of economics varies considerably according to whether it is defined in terms of explicit knowledge, as the neoclassical economists have done, or implicit know how, as the heterodox economists do.  Explicit knowledge is codified and formal in the shape of mathematical and axiomatic thinking, and it does not tolerate the inclusion of implicit know how in the economist’s bailiwick, because of its pretended lack of rigor.  Explicit knowledge of neoclassical economics has shaped the discussion about what economics is (micro and macroeconomics, orthodox and heterodox, etc.) In it, critical factors that are entwined with the economy, i.e., legal. educational, and democratic institutions (laws on co-determinatiion, works, councils, supervisory boards, business schools, firm governance) in their diverse manifestations are ignored.

It is imperative for the story of economics to be properly told, that the explicit and implicit be given equal weight in the telling.

References

Johnson, H. Thomas and Bröms, Anders (2000). Profits Beyond Measure: Extradordinary Results from Attention to Process and People. Boston

Leclerc, Max. (1917).  La formation des ingénieurs à l’éetranger et en France. Paris.

Jeffrey K. Liker (2017). “Building CI habits through practices: Lean is about a fundamental change in thinking.  How do we teach our brains to make the change,” Target, AME, Fall 1917.

Locke, Robert (1984).  The End of the Practical Man : Entrepreneurship and Education in Germany, France, and Great Britain, 1880=1940). JAI Press.

Nelson, C. Hewetson (1911).  « Professional education, » The Incorporated Accountants Journal. 23, October.

Rother, Mike (2010).  Toyota Kata : Managing People for Improvement, Adaptiveness, and Superior Results. New York.

_________________(1914).  About the Toyota Kata Research. Ann Arbor.

 

Vogt, ‘Winfried.  Erich Schneider und die Wirtschaftstheorie,” in Gottfried Bombach and Michael Tacke (eds) (1980) Erich Schneider 1900-1970 Gedenkband und Bibliographie,

  1. spender7
    October 24, 2017 at 8:55 pm

    There should be no limit to the number of times we get reminded that to be ‘relevant’ our economic and/or management theorizing must be brought into the world of our own experience and practice. There it can make contact with the real-world social anxieties that should be our focus. Yes, we should be doing something useful for others, not merely doodling rigorously to fill the journals that institutionalize our uselessness.

    There can be no definitive or conclusive way of bringing our thinking into our world if we do not admit our world is uncertain, known only in part, if at all. Making sense under these conditions requires us not only to characterize – and so set up logical discussion and testable hypotheses – but also to historicize, locate our thinking and experience in the history of the situation being examined. We can only dispense with history by assuming certainty – and this would render further inquiry wasteful.

    We are not likely to escape the a-historical methodological hegemony we have created for ourselves until we examine and confront the history of how this happened – and why. We have to realize (a) it happened, and (b) it was no accident. Until then our impoverishment will repeat itself – tragedy and farce indeed.

  2. October 24, 2017 at 9:04 pm

    Consider Heaviside as an example of the success of deep learning by doing. Take Tesla as a counter example. Tesla defeated Edison by his formal European math training. Of course all these shared genius and hard work. Definitely a bias toward abstraction in macroeconomic thinking combined with terrible simplifying assumptions of preordained equilibrium and failure to keep up with nonlinear and dynamic systems analytic tools and methods.

  3. October 24, 2017 at 11:04 pm

    Absolutely a marvelous post! Kudos!

  4. Craig
    October 24, 2017 at 11:51 pm

    Sapient indeed. Sapient as in integrative and Wise. What is needed is an integration of both of the mindsets you refer to. An integration that simultaneously informs abstractly and philosophically and, aligned with that philosophy, crafts and implements policies that, looking directly at the actual operations of commerce and their economic and monetary significance, then makes those policies work effectively and beneficially for virtually all agents.

  5. October 25, 2017 at 11:56 am

    I agree wholeheartedly with Larry and Craig, not least because I’m one of the old generation of apprentice trained scientists myself. With Peter I count Heaviside as a mentor, but it is perhaps worth mentioning that apprenticeships timeshare between developing skills, practical theory and mathematics. Heaviside’s “self-teaching” began with trying to understand the mathematics of Maxwell, which he needed to do to become able to simplify it (as when he effectively reduced its calculus to algebra). From that developed his contributions to the understanding and technology of long-distance cable and radio transmissions. Shannon, likewise, though he produced “The Mathematical Theory of Communication”, worked initially in the design of an automatic telephone exchange, and then in the decoding of encrypted information. However, he knew enough about logic and radio communication to recognise the possibilities of computer technology and correction of transmission errors when he saw them. The significance of thinking both practically and linguistically is that linguistic argument is only as strong as its weakest link, but a picture with half its pixels missing can still be recognisable.

    In that sense Professor Locke’s historical picture is still most instructive, despite not dwelling on how theory and practice tend to exercise respectively the verbal and visual sides of the brain. Let me fill in the gaps with a vision of Shannon exercising both sides of his brain by riding round on a unicycle, then putting its axle off-centre to make it even more demanding! Nothing as good as Professor Locke’s contribution here comes without a lot of practice.

    • October 25, 2017 at 4:05 pm

      We don’t lionize our greats like we once did. I remember using a two volume tome by Spivac titled: Differential Geometry. The first twenty pages he titled: Differential
      Geometry Before Gauss, the remaining 700 pages in two volumes be titled: Differential Geometry After Gauss. Same could be said of Heaviside in communications, and Bode in control theory. Maybe Steve Keen will emerge as the guy who polished off macroeconomic modeling. I hope so.

      • October 25, 2017 at 5:56 pm

        Peter, thank you for the reference to Bode. I was fascinated with positive feedback producing squealing amplifiers from 1954, but by the time I got round to stability theory c.1964 we were using Nyquist plots. Bode had remained just a name.

        On macro-economic modelling, what Nick says below has some relevance to my thoughts about Steve Keen’s simulations, which are so destructive of today’s macro modelling. He quotes:

        ” at Neuroscience 2013, the annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience, one researcher reported that “mindfulness (explicit knowledge) may help prevent formation of automatic habits — which is done through implicit learning.”

        I can agree with Nick that mindfulness is not explicit knowledge but the possibility of it: “awareness of the field itself; of the type or ontology of specifics. However, to focus on this is not to disappear the specifics but to disappear the micro aggregation problem: to insist one can only add specifics to things of the same type. As I see it, macro models can help us see what is possible, like “glasses” enabling us to focus on what appears in the field. And yes, Nick, behind the type which comprises the model is the ego/computer interpreting what it sees through the glasses – distorting, rose-tinted or otherwise.

  6. Nick
    October 25, 2017 at 4:57 pm

    I have a minor problem with the definition of ‘mindfulness’ as ‘explicit knowledge’.

    Mindfulness is NOT awareness of contents of consciousness it is awareness of the field itself – to maintain that awareness of the field itself is to refuse to ‘pursue’ or identify with ANY content as this ‘disappears’ the field in favour of the content (which ‘appears’ in the field)

    (and when the field disappears the ‘ego/self’ appears)

  7. October 27, 2017 at 6:36 am

    Robert, excellent essay. Just two points.

    First, much of what you describe is the result of an overformal view of science that strictly separates it from the objects it studies. The social studies of science (SSS) rejects any such elevation of science or its history. For SSS there is no essential difference between science and other forms of knowledge production; there is nothing intrinsically special about ‘the scientific method;’ indeed, even if there is such a thing as ‘scientific method’ much scientific practice proceeds despite the canons of scientific method rather than because of them. At least one philosopher (Feyerabend) argues we are unlikely to produce reliable knowledge unless we deliberately flout the rules of science. Since our own standpoint is shot through with presumptions about what it is to be scientific, we cannot continue to separate science from our own efforts at understanding, from what (for us) counts as an adequate account, from the grounds on which our own deliberations might be considered persuasive. SSS is a project which is neither safe nor very comfortable. It raises fundamental questions which persistently rebound upon the questioner and prompt awkward doubts about the cool, clinical relationship sometimes imagined existing between social scientist and the object of study. The analyst cannot be detached from the object in any straightforward sense. precisely because it is this distinction, the separation between analysis and object, which is the lynchpin of the fundamental rationale for science itself. Science as taught in the textbooks is structured around cartesian dualisms — between self and other, between subject and object, representation and reality. SSS challenges these. It’s not that science has its ‘social aspects’ implying that a residual (hard core) kernel of science proceeds untainted by extraneous non-scientific (i.e. ‘social’) factors, but that science is itself constitutively social. This means that just as we should abandon the idea of science as a privileged or even just separate domain of activity and inquiry, similarity the notion of ‘social’ (similarity ‘cultural’ ‘psychological’ and so on) must be substantially modified. The potential consequence of our radical study of science is no less than to make redundant the very concepts of ‘social’ and ‘society.’ SSS offers a way beyond some of the difficulties Robert describes. But the results are disconcerting and uncomfortable for all involved.
    Readings:
    Barnes, Barry (ed.). (1972). Sociology of Science, Readings.
    Barnes, Barry, David Bloor & John Henry. (1996) Scientific Knowledge, A Sociological Analysis.
    Latour, Bruno, and Steve Woolgar. (1986). Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts.
    Latour, Bruno. (1988, 1977). Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society.
    Nader, Laura. (1996). Naked Science: Anthropological Inquiry into Boundaries, Power, and Knowledge.
    Pickering, Andrew. (1984) CONSTRUCTING QUARKS, A Sociological History of Particle Physics.
    Woolgar, Steve. (1988) Science: The Very Idea.
    Wulf, Andrea. (2015). The Invention of Nature: Alexander van Humboldt’s New World.

    One of the consequences of SSS is that science is revealed as a ‘cottage industry.’ Science is a community of interested actors pursing similar goals, learning from and teaching one another, mostly in nonexplicit (tacit) ways. Science, supposedly the most formal of formalities is revealed as non-formal, nonlogical, and based on tacit knowledge and understandings.

    Second, my company just filed comments at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) on behalf of two clients. In its high-profile study released in August, the Energy Department (DOE) listed the Federal Power Act (FPA) as a potential means to address resilience and grid reliability issues. A month later, the DOE issued a proposed rulemaking under the FPA to provide cost recovery for merchant coal and nuclear plants with 90 days of fuel supply onsite (defining these as baseload plants). Now the FPA is central to arguments from the supporters of the proposed rulemaking. They say FERC has historically interpreted the law too narrowly and failed to adequately. But representatives from a wide array of trade groups say otherwise (our comments). Under the FPA, FERC must find the existing structure doesn’t work, and is unjust, unreasonable and discriminates against resources and customers And if FERC finds that the existing structure fails to measure up, the agency must establish a remedy that is “just and reasonable.” No one denies that resilience is an important topic that needs to be addressed. Supporters of the proposed rule argue that current markets do not produce just and reasonable outcomes either in terms of resilience or pricing. They argue that merchant coal and nuclear plants improve resilience but are not compensated for this service. Opponents of the rule argue these plants want compensation for resilience that other plants (natural gas, renewable) are already providing at a lower cost to consumers. These comments are filled with graphs and equations, and lots of jargon. Most of which have little significance for decision making. Which will be based primarily on the notions of fairness, justice, and reasonableness. All loosely defined legally but having no quantitative definition. With one exception the five FERC Commissioners who will make this decision have years of experience in understanding and applying the notions of fairness, justice, and reasonableness. The lone exception is the new FERC Chairman, Neil Chatterjee. One week after his appointment Chatterjee said this on FERC’s podcast, “I believe that generation, including our existing coal and nuclear fleet, need to be properly compensated to recognize the value they provide to the system.” Chatterjee also has no previous experience in making energy or rate decisions, having been a lawyer working as a Republican political operative his entire career. He’s clearly the ideologue in this group of practical regulators at FERC, as the quote above clearly shows.

    • robert locke
      October 27, 2017 at 8:26 am

      Ken, I didn’t find Fritjof Capra’s 1992 book, The Turning Point, on your list. H Thomas Johnson listed it as one of four books that influenced his thinking about management in his journey from being a professor of accounting to sustainable management. I found your point about the present of the investigator in the investigation at every turn; it was all about the end of Cartesian dualism and reductionism in our thinking. I’m sure you know it.

      • robert locke
        October 27, 2017 at 8:27 am

        I MEANT 1982 book.

      • October 27, 2017 at 12:04 pm

        Robert, two reasons I left Capra off the list. First, I wanted to include only selections I believed were easier to read. Capra’s books are descriptively thick and difficult to read. But you’re correct about Capra’s significance. Second, Pickering’s “Constructing Quarks” is more narrowly focused on examining how science is in fact performed, in contrast to the descriptions of science in the press and some textbooks.

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